Third, a joint command mechanism should be developed. Although the Triple Entente lacked a unified command, it effectively coordinated through the Supreme War Council in 1917. Today’s trilateral cooperation could achieve a similar objective by introducing a standing maritime coordination cell or a rotational combined command structure. Such measures could guarantee interoperability without requiring an immediate treaty obligation.
Lastly, economic and technological linkages should be internalised. Just as the United Kingdom and France utilised industrial cooperation, today’s three countries should integrate supply chain security, semiconductor collaboration, and defence-industrial integration. This would create resilience not only in the defence domain but also in the broader systemic context vis-à-vis the SCO bloc.
The risk of a dual contingency – China’s invasion of Taiwan and North Korea’s military provocation against South Korea occurring simultaneously – is no longer hypothetical. As the Atlantic Council wargame results indicate, such a scenario could seriously impact US power if alliances do not act cohesively.
By treating the trilateral framework as a modern entente, the United States, Japan and South Korea could bridge the credibility gap regarding extended deterrence, reassure domestic publics, and clearly signal to Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang that coordinated aggression would be met with coordinated defence.
Although the SCO bloc is not a unitary actor, its growing level of integration reflects a shift towards sharper bloc politics. In response, the US–Japan–South Korea framework should not remain a loosely connected mechanism. Like the Entente Cordiale, it should gradually develop into an institutionalised structure – one that transforms shared interests into a shared strategy.
As history demonstrates, if an entente can adapt to evolving threats and promise gradual consolidation, it can offer effective deterrence similar to that of a formal alliance. The current task is to ensure that trilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia does not remain an experiment but matures into a central pillar of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.