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The Trump administration’s policies have been a net negative for US power in Asia, but their true effect will only be felt in the years ahead.
Susannah Patton
Susannah Patton is Director, Asia Engagement at RMIT and a Nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
Jack Sato
Jack Sato is a Data Analyst for the Asia Power Index at the Lowy Institute.
The United States remains the top power in Asia. Yet in 2025, it recorded the largest decline in comprehensive power of any country included in the Asia Power Index, reducing US power to its lowest level since the inception of the Index in 2018. This decline is attributable to both structural factors as well as the early policies and approaches of the second Trump administration to the region.
The United States recorded small declines in every resource measure, indicating an erosion in the economic and military underpinnings of its power in Asia. China’s lead for economic capability strengthened slightly, narrowing the United States’ lead for this measure. The “exorbitant privilege” that the United States enjoys because of the dollar’s position as the global reserve currency, as well as a range of other indicators assessing the relative international leverage of countries in Asia, show the United States faces little serious competition in this field. Its technological prowess remains strong. It enjoys an unparalleled level of resilience — the capacity to deter threats to state stability. However, even the solid growth rate of the US economy in 2025 faces a long-term challenge from relatively faster growing economies in Asia, particularly China.
China also continues to steadily erode the United States’ advantage in terms of military capability. In 2025, the United States’ lead for this measure is just two-thirds of what it was in 2017. China’s improvement is led by growth in its maritime and air warfare capabilities. Military experts surveyed also appraised China as having improved in terms of technology, maintenance, and range of its weapons systems, as well as in its area denial capabilities. And while Washington’s focus is global, Beijing’s military resources are concentrated close to home: China continues to enjoy the lead it established over the United States in the 2024 edition of the Asia Power Index in terms of military posture in Asia.
In 2025, the Trump administration has sought to harness latent US economic power more directly through explicitly coercive and transactional diplomacy, including in Asia. Most notably, it has imposed large tariffs in response to perceived unfair trade practices or imbalanced trade. It has also sought to increase investment into the United States while screening investment from China and other adversaries more closely. The long-term impact of these policies on US power will depend in part on their effect on US domestic economic performance. It will also depend on whether these policies ultimately fulfil their intent of rebalancing US economic relationships or simply curtail US economic engagement with countries in Asia by making the United States a less accessible export destination for goods from Asia. Experts surveyed for the Asia Power Index were sceptical of President Trump’s economic statecraft, ranking the United States just fifth for this indicator (see box below).
The 2025 Asia Power Index includes a new indicator measuring economic statecraft based on a survey of regional experts. Measuring the efficacy of a country’s leader in advancing his or her country’s economic interests globally, the survey found that China led this indicator, followed by Singapore, Japan, Vietnam, the United States, and South Korea. Taken after the announcement of swingeing US tariffs on Liberation Day, the result suggests that experts were cautious about whether these tariffs were likely to be a net positive for US interests.
While US defence networks with countries in Asia have been characterised by continuity, uncertainty about the Trump administration’s foreign policy approaches has caused a collapse in the US score for the diplomatic influence measure in the 2025 Asia Power Index. The United States recorded a steep decline in its score for the foreign policy sub-measure, falling to eighth place, behind Vietnam. Experts surveyed by the Lowy Institute to inform these scores appraised President Trump's regional leadership negatively, likely reflecting a lack of early focus on Asia and the impact of global policies such as the imposition of tariffs and cuts to funding for aid and media. The United States also recorded a large decline for global leadership, an indicator for which the Biden administration scored highly, though the survey was taken prior to President Trump’s successful brokering of the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire agreement.
A further factor that may curtail US influence in Asia in the years ahead is the declining attractiveness of the United States as a travel destination, a trend that will likely be sharpened due to the Trump administration’s travel policies, which are making it more difficult to obtain visas to the United States. This may also affect the competitiveness of the United States as a destination for international students from Asia
