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China remains largest infrastructure partner, but new project signings have stalled
China still dominates infrastructure spending in Southeast Asia, but post-2021 commitments remain a fraction of historic levels. As the financing gap grows and concessional capital shrinks, the MDBs are positioned to play a larger role
Infrastructure financing in the region is heavily concentrated: the six largest financiers accounted for 90% of total infrastructure spending in 2024. China remains dominant, accounting for about 31% in 2024 and 39% since 2015. Japan is the next-largest infrastructure partner at 21%, followed by the ADB (17%) and the World Bank (10%).
Almost 90% of Chinaโs 2024 ODF spending was on infrastructure. In Cambodia, infrastructure accounted for 64% of Chinaโs 2024 ODF, including $247.5 million for the Phnom Penh airport. In the Philippines, it accounted for 100%, including $213 million for the Kaliwa Dam, while in Myanmar, 55% was focused on infrastructure, including for the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port.
Legacy projects ensure China will remain a large infrastructure financing partner for the region. But commitments to new infrastructure projects appear to have stalled for the third consecutive year. This provides further evidence that China is taking on a more selective financing role as it shifts away from ambitious megaprojects towards smaller, easier-to-manage infrastructure projects.
The reduction in ODF by both traditional and non-traditional development partners will place pressure on the region in meeting its huge infrastructure financing gap, estimated at around $3.1 trillion when adjusted for climate impacts. The use of blended finance structures โ where public or philanthropic funds are used to attract private sector investment โ holds some promise. But aid cuts have reduced the availability of the concessional capital needed to draw in private sector investors. Meanwhile, cascading shocks have increased not only fiscal stress but also perceived risks in the region, all of which are likely to limit the appetite of private investors.
MDBs could step up to fill this gap. Representing 32% of the regionโs ODF infrastructure spending in 2024, they have steadily increased both spending and commitments since 2022. MDBs offer a rare stability that could provide much-needed certainty in increasingly uncertain times.
About the authors
Rahul Nath
Dr Rahul Nath is a Research Fellow at the Lowy Instituteโs Indo-Pacific Development Centre and is responsible for the Instituteโs Southeast Asia Aid Map. His research areas include aid and development policy, development finance, sovereign debt, macroeconomic dynamics, multilateral development banks, and climate finance.
Taili Ni
Taili Ni is a Research Associate in the Indo-Pacific Development Centre at the Lowy Institute, working on the Southeast Asia Aid Map. Her work focuses on tracking and analysing foreign aid and development finance flows to Southeast Asia.
Graceย Stanhope
Grace Stanhope is a former Research Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Development Centre at the Lowy Institute, working on the Southeast Asia Aid Map. Her work focused on tracking and analysing foreign aid and development finance flows to Southeast Asia.
Alexandre Dayant
Alexandre Dayant is a senior economist and former Deputy Director of the Indo-Pacific Development Centre, a dedicated policy research centre within the Lowy Institute.
Roland Rajah
Roland Rajah is Lead Economist and Director of the Indo-Pacific Development Centre at the Lowy Institute, focusing on economic development challenges across Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and South Asia. His research spans macroeconomics, aid and development finance, geoeconomics, and regional integration.