Real progress is being made across Pillar II, with the public announcement of experimentation and demonstrations across four areas.
In the Artificial Intelligence stream (which had Autonomy subsequently appended) for example, the three partners have achieved two world firsts. These were “the live retraining of models in flight and the interchange of AI models between AUKUS nations” as part of “a collaborative swarm to detect and track military targets in real time”.
The AUKUS Electronic Warfare Innovation Challenge, started in March 2024, is another example of publicly avowed Pillar II progress, as is the touted implementation of a trilateral algorithm to share sensor data across the P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine naval aircraft.
Due to the highly sensitive nature of the capabilities being developed, much of Pillar II remains secret. More is happening out of the public view.
But with public criticism of both pillars of AUKUS growing, the impression is that the announcements about “functional areas” and the addition of new advanced capabilities are being made in a bid to illustrate progress.
Perhaps the most troubling example of this is the speculation about new countries joining Pillar II.
New Zealand’s Prime Minister Chris Luxon told the Lowy Institute in August that his country “could potentially partner in Pillar II”. Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has also said that he has held “excellent conversations” with AUKUS leaders about joining Pillar II. While Japan’s prospective membership featured in the April 2024 AUKUS Defence Ministers’ Joint Statement.
Though there are arguments in favour of each of these nations joining or partnering in Pillar II initiatives, the test of progress should be building upon and consolidating the initial aims and achieving advanced capability milestones.
The temptation to conjure attention-grabbing headlines by expanding the remit or membership of the grouping should be resisted.