China, explained.
A flag raising ceremony on 31 January 2024 to celebrate Nauru’s 56 years of independence: Australia will contribute $40 million for local police following the Nauru-Australia Treaty (Alexandra Peek, via Pat Conroy MP/DFAT)
The potential for a bidding war should be acknowledged.
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Australia’s new chequebook diplomacy in the PacificAustralia’s new chequebook diplomacy in the Pacific
Sam Roggeveen confidently declares “Australia effectively closes off any possibility of Chinese military basing” in the Pacific with deals such as the Nauru and Tuvalu treaties. And this seems to make intuitive sense. These agreements are being lauded as giving Australia an effective veto over the security relationship for those countries.
But rather than an “end” to the game, these moves could equally be read as upping the stakes.
Australia has previously derided the “chequebook diplomacy” that China and Taiwan practised across the Pacific, using foreign aid in a bid to win diplomatic recognition. This carried the risk of abetting local corruption.
Other countries also sought advantage. Russia, for instance, convinced Nauru and Tuvalu at one time to recognise the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 war with Georgia, in Nauru’s case in return for a reported US$50 million.
Australia also took advantage of Nauru’s sovereign independence to skirt its own obligations under the refugee convention by supporting asylum seeker processing on the small island country.
All of which is understandable from Nauru’s perspective, as its sovereignty is a commodity that has a value, and leaning on it provides a return to the country. Similarly for Tuvalu.
The Pacific Island countries have their own interests and leverage, and China can also mess about in the region cheaply.
The deal with Nauru is not a blank cheque from Australia. The government has said that $100 million in budget support will be provided to Nauru over the next five years, plus $40 million for local police. These figures are not specified in the text of the Nauru-Australia Treaty, so it can be assumed there will be an expectation of ongoing support. The treaty does include a specific clause on “governance and transparency”, with Nauru committing to “prevent fraud, corruption, and misconduct”.
That wording matters. So does the stipulation that “Nauru shall mutually agree with Australia” any partnership with another country related to defence and policing.
But it’s worth remembering that Nauru also had a deal with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition up until January this year, before switching to China. This was not its first swap either. Nauru had established an embassy in Beijing in 2002, before changing its diplomatic stance back to Taiwan in 2005. None of which should be taken to assume bad faith on the part of Nauru in the signing of the new deal with Australia. It carries the status of a treaty, after all, making this a firm expression of its intentions and as strong a commitment as Australia could hope to win. The diplomatic history is important to acknowledge, however, only in the potential to create a bidding war.
Roggeveen is right that this approach is far cheaper for Australia than trying to compete with China’s hard military power. But his geographical point cuts both ways. The Pacific Island countries have their own interests and leverage, and China can also mess about in the region cheaply. The prospect of China dropping a couple of oil barrels and a soldier in Solomon Islands a couple of years back set off a strident reaction in Canberra – “China could have Solomon Islands military base within four weeks” declared one prediction in April 2022.
International agreements are not immutable. But the proximity of the Pacific to Australia is one thing that won’t change. This contest has a way to play out yet.
About the author
Daniel Flitton
Daniel Flitton is one of Australia’s most experienced foreign affairs journalists and is Managing Editor of the Lowy Institute’s international magazine, The Interpreter.
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