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Pacific Islands, explained.

Heightened interest by Australian political leaders in security pacts has given Pacific Islands leverage to request new and different forms of assistance but this has rarely translated into shifting agendas to addressing local causes of conflict (@AlboMP/X)
As Australian security pacts multiply across the Pacific, the peace priorities of island nations are being left adrift.
About the authors
Anouk Ride
Dr Anouk Ride is a sociologist with an interest in development and peace and conflict in the Pacific Islands region. She was based in Solomon Islands for two decades doing policy orientated research and has managed over 20 projects with Pacific governments, media, police and correctional services, regional organisations and universities.
Tania Miletic
Dr Tania Miletic is the Co Director of the University of Melbourne’s Initiative for Peacebuilding, working to promote multidisciplinary research, teaching and policy development that supports effective engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the Indo Pacific region.
Pacts between Australia and Pacific Islands nations are multiplying, as is the practice ofAustralia rolling together aid and security in its negotiations that becomebinding “peace” or “security” agreements – or both.
Everyone acknowledges Australian interests in these pacts – Australia sees China as a threat and seeks to establish itself as the main security partner with Pacific countries, particularly for anything police or military related. Pacts include “mutual agreement” on security matters involving third parties (Tuvalu and Nauru) to “consultation” (Vanuatu) to allyship (Papua New Guinea and Fiji).
Pacific interests for peace and security are broader and how to get it may be more contested. Peace in the Pacific Islands is less about whose side you are on in geopolitical contests and more about coordinated efforts towards addressing structural causes of violence – which in the Pacific includes colonialism, militarisation and inequality (Opens in new window). The regional Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration (Opens in new window) positions peace and security as broader in both conception and practice: in the “Pacific worldview, where peace, security and development are interconnected and mutually reinforcing”. Security threats mentioned here are not China but byproducts of power plays and economic exploitation: coercion, nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, climate change, internal conflict and social exclusion, technological change and failure of donors to fund meaningful development.
Conversely, peaceful ways forward are suggested in the “Pacific Way” of resolving disputes through respect and dialogue, with the relational over the transactional supporting decision-making between trusted partners. Regional cooperation in the declaration is to address interlinked climate action, nuclear-free status, healthy oceans and international law, while nationally there is a need for inclusive governance, and local rather than external agendas for development.
Regional security pacts could be helpful for peace if focused on demilitarisation and denuclearisation, but as the Chinese missile test underlined, could escalate geopolitical conflict if the pact is perceived as a threat. Such escalations may not be limited to weaponry, but may extend to influence campaigns and instability in Pacific politics.

Papua New Guinea Defence Force soldiers alongside Australian Army soldiers during Exercise Wantok Warrior at Mount Stuart Training Area, Townsville, Queensland in June 2026 (William McCormick/Defence Imagery)
Heightened interest by Australian political leaders in security pacts has given Pacific Islands leverage to request new and different forms of assistance but this has rarely translated into shifting agendas to addressing local causes of conflict. As defined by the National Security Strategy, Papua New Guinea’s key conflict risks are tribal fighting in the highlands, crime – including transnational crime such as drugs and gun smuggling – border security and cybersecurity as well as violence against women, corruption, resource conflicts and health, climate change or disaster related issues.
However, the inordinate focus of the new PukPuk pact on defence, and very limited public consultations, means both reduced attention on internal security issues, and high risks (Opens in new window) of defence resources reinforcing violent actors, gun violence and use of force against dissent.The pact is light on how peace and security arrangements support the ongoing political process between Bougainville and PNG – and has raised questions about what role Australia plays in relation to PNG and Indonesia.
The latest security pact (Opens in new window), between Fiji and Australia also makes mention of peace in the title and UN norms of seeking peaceful settlements to disputes but does not explain what peace is and how it might be achieved. Like PNG, the pact will bring greater police and military cooperation. How the pacts will lead to the strengthening of relational frameworks that enable the Declaration’s vision of inclusive and consensus-orientated decision making, with involvement not just of elites, but civil society and others, remains to be seen. This may be critical internally in Fiji which has a history of military coups and entanglement with political power (Opens in new window).
As pacts are launched around the Pacific, with big spends and a hectic pace, there is often little public consultation.
Vanuatu’s National Security Strategy sets out its key problems as crimes related to foreign fishing and transnational crime, cybersecurity, border security (including biosecurity as critical to people’s main income through agriculture) and climate change and natural disasters. Yet the Nakamal Agreement (Opens in new window) with Australia delivers little to change these conditions. The agreement lacks substance (Opens in new window) and reaffirms Australia’s already given commitment to net zero and climate adaptation and adding a mixed bag of clauses on migration, blackbirding, private sector linkages and “budget support” for “fiscal certainty”.
Arguably, the smallest nation to sign a security pact with Australia, Tuvalu has had the most success in obtaining an agreement that addresses its core security threats. While monitoring, control and surveillance for its Exclusive Economic Zone is a concern, its biggest threat is climate change. Being small low-lying islands, Tuvalu is affected by a range of climate threats (Opens in new window), and prospects of climate migration. The Australia-Tuvalu pact (Opens in new window) addresses that head on by providing for migration pathways to Australia, coastal protection and climate adaptation and support for Tuvalu sovereignty over resources and culture (including through digital sovereignty).
So, what will Solomon Islands new government, led by Prime Minister Matthew Wale do in negotiating a pact? His predecessor was focused on police capacity and unrest following a disastrous riot in November 2021 (Opens in new window), and citing this as a rationale for the controversial China-Solomon security pact in 2022. Wale has already indicated a focus on the structures of power causing conflict – reviewing lost revenue from extractive industries, closing loopholes for minerals to be sent overseas without proper regulation, prioritising indigenous business in government contracts and seeking support to expand job and educational opportunities for its young population. The country’s national security strategy retains a focus on social cohesion and peacebuilding given the country’s post-conflict status, as well as corruption, crime, border and maritime security, environmental security and climate change, and cybersecurity.
The Australia-Solomon Islands pact will be an interesting case to see whether new pacts are actually about local peace and security priorities, or just bilateral aid negotiations by another means, with a side serving of Australia’s strategic denial. As pacts are launched around the Pacific, with big spends and a hectic pace (Opens in new window), there is often little public consultation. We are yet to see serious review of whether previous arrangements with Australia helped address security threats in the islands. Such reviews would be wise for Pacific countries engaging in such pacts, while Australia has opportunities to ask what the pacts could be if peace and security are foregrounded.
Security for Pacific Islands is unlikely if peace is left adrift in a sea of pacts.