While agreement to establish the permanent Secretariat was signed in 2024, the Iran war has acted as a strong catalyst for these Indian Ocean states to formalise the regional security group. In essence the CSC will become the premier maritime security forum in the Northeast Indian Ocean.
India’s leadership in the Conclave formalisation represents a significant gain in fostering practical cooperation with littoral states on shared non-traditional threats.
India pushed the revival of the CSC for the past decade as its primary institutional architect. This has been in response to China’s ongoing efforts to limit India’s influence, through controlling sea lines of communication, ports and trade. Regardless, India has long been a driver for building regional structures in the Indian Ocean region, particularly led through its maritime focused SAGAR policy, which has since evolved into the more expansive MAHASAGAR vision (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), reflecting its more integrated approach to maritime cooperation, security, and regional development.
Since its 2011 inception, the CSC has had a rocky history with long bouts of stagnation and domestic political frictions. Starting out as a trilateral between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, after its 2020 revival its membership expanded to include Mauritius (2022), Bangladesh (2024) and Seychelles (2025).
This uplift of the CSC reflects the changing dynamics of the Indian Ocean region - a trend towards states building smaller, issue-focused and hyper-functional minilateral arrangements. Larger institutional partnerships, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), remain politically paralysed. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), of which Australia is a founding member, lacks a hard security mandate. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), with its “consensus-bound regionalism” approach requiring unanimous endorsement of all participants, lacks a permanent operational structure. The CSC fills this vacuum by being geographically concentrated, security-oriented, and operationally focused.
China’s expanding presence through naval deployments, dual-use infrastructure projects and growing political influence in Sri Lanka and the Maldives has also intensified India’s concerns about the strategic balance in its maritime neighbourhood. These include Beijing’s long-term lease of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, the recurring docking of Chinese surveillance vessels like the Shi Yan 6, and the Maldives’ recent bilateral military assistance pact with Beijing.
Beijing may likely view the CSC’s institutionalisation as India consolidating its sphere of influence to limit China. On the other hand, Washington may welcome such regional burden-sharing as aligning with its broader interests in the Indo-Pacific, although the unpredictability of the Trump administration’s foreign policy makes any long-term assessment uncertain.