China, explained.
Children pose on a destroyer during an open day marking the 75th anniversary of China’s navy. The square hatches behind them are the ship’s vertical launch system, comprising of upright canisters containing missiles. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
Australia needs to be prepared not just for the missile power of China's fleet today, but how it will look in a decade.
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China's naval growth goes verticalChina's naval growth goes vertical
China has sent Australia a message in recent days about the strength of its rapidly growing naval fleet, already the largest in the world by numbers. But the reaction in Australia to the flotilla of Chinese warships in local waters has also underscored the need to improve public knowledge about Beijing’s capability.
Understanding the facts about China’s military build-up can only create a more robust conversation in Australia about how best to respond.
Outrage centred on China’s live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea, while there was speculation about the prospect of a nuclear-powered submarine trailing secretly under the surface.
China’s ambassador, Xiao Qian, has made it clear that Australia should expect more deployments like this in the future, so it’s important to ensure that information about China’s growing fleet is well understood.
The flotilla that passed down the east coast and south across Australia was composed of a Type-055 Renhai-class destroyer, a Type-054A Jiangkai II-class frigate, a replenishment vessel, and possibly a nuclear-powered attack submarine – likely a Shang/Shang II-class SSN.
The surface vessels are potent. Between them (Opens in new window), the Renhai and Jiangkai II possess 152 vertical launch system (VLS) missile cells. Most of the missiles in these cells would be dedicated to hitting enemy ships, aircraft, and incoming missiles, with only a portion given over to land-attack weapons. In contrast, the Royal Australian Navy’s whole surface fleet of three Hobart-class destroyers and seven Anzac-class frigates possess 200 VLS cells.
Under the terms of the 2024 Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Review, once Australia acquires the future Hunter-class frigate and the six large optionally-crewed surface vessels, the RAN will possess 528 VLS cells. The PLA Navy, meantime, may presently field approximately 4432 VLS cells. While no one reasonably suggests that the ADF should be able to go toe-to-toe with a military as large as China’s, the comparison is instructive.
China’s ambassador, Xiao Qian, has made it clear that Australia should expect more deployments like this in the future.
China is expanding its surface fleet even as it retires older vessels. As newer platforms continue to come into service, the PLAN will likely double its total VLS count over the coming decade out to 2035. The nearly 9,000 cells it will then possess brings the PLAN up to where the US Navy is today.
| Total frigates | Total destroyers | Total VLS cells | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 57 | 51 | 4,432 |
| 2030 | 57 | 59 | 5,368 |
| 2035 | 60 | 67 | 8,896 |
Figure 1 – Author’s analysis based on IISS data, Pentagon assessments, and analysis from the US Naval Institute and The Diplomat, among others.
It should also be noted that many PLAN vessels operate weapons that launch without the use of VLS cells, meaning that the total number of missiles in its surface fleet is greater than the 4432 figure for 2025.
This is not to generate anxieties that thousands of missiles may begin raining down across the eastern seaboard at a moment’s notice. Such suggestions are neither responsible nor considered. But, however China’s goals and intentions for the next decade are interpreted, these are just some of the tools with which it has equipped itself to achieve them.
Understanding the facts about China’s military build-up can only create a more robust conversation in Australia about how best to respond.
About the author
David Vallance
David Vallance is a Research Associate in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute.
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