China, explained.
China is the second-largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping and deploys more uniformed personnel than all other permanent members of the Security Council combined (Glody Murhabazi/AFP via Getty Images)
Africa's security marketplace is crowded, but China has an increasingly prominent position.
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China's security offerings gain traction in AfricaChina's security offerings gain traction in Africa
Western analyses of China in Africa habitually default to binaries – influence versus interference, partnership versus capture, democracy versus authoritarianism, China versus the United States. Such framing says more about Western strategic anxiety than African political realities. That disconnect reflects the fact that in Africa, China is not seen primarily as a rapacious bogeyman, but as one of many actors in an increasingly crowded and transactional security landscape.
When South Africa quietly signed a military agreement with China in late 2025 worth a reported ZAR 241 million (AU$22 million) for a much-needed upgrade to a Mobilisation and Demobilisation Centre, Western commentary framed it within a familiar debate about China’s intentions in Africa – was it genuine partnership, or advancing strategic interests under the guise of cooperation? In South Africa itself, the reaction was muted. The deal generated some criticism but was not seen as exceptional or, given the amounts involved, game-changing.
African governments know that China is expanding its footprint. The question for them is how to exercise sovereignty when security needs are growing, resources are scarce, and external offers are multifarious and conditional.
China has established a logistics base in Djibouti, and has a growing naval presence in the western Indian Ocean. But focusing on bases and ports obscures China’s modus operandi: incremental, pragmatic, and invariably through multilateral frameworks where African states participate.
Beyond peacekeeping, China’s security engagement is increasingly bespoke.
For instance, China is the second-largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping and deploys more uniformed personnel than all other permanent members of the Security Council combined. Most deployments are in high-risk environments: South Sudan and Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali. For African governments, this matters. Chinese peacekeeping is largely welcomed, as it provides personnel and technical support when many other nations are increasingly reluctant to.
However, China is neither neutral nor altruistic. Peacekeeping deployments align with commercial and geostrategic interests and provide valuable operational experience for the People’s Liberation Army. But it’s also not purely extractive or predatory. Many deployments do not link directly to investment interests, and China remains committed to African-led and UN-mandated frameworks. With the United States retreating from multilateralism and pursuing transactional diplomacy, this distinction strengthens China’s political capital.
Beyond peacekeeping, China’s security engagement is increasingly bespoke. China adapts to Africa’s emerging priorities: countering violent extremism and organised crime, and supporting maritime security and infrastructure protection. Training programs, equipment transfers, and technical assistance are tailored, though not always well-matched to local contexts. The critical question is whether China’s inputs align with African-defined needs and priorities.
Sovereignty considerations are challenging. Defence budgets in Africa remain small, and foreign security assistance is rarely unconditional. Chinese support is often tied to foreign policy and investment interests. Chinese infrastructure projects necessitate securing supply chains, ports, and transport corridors. This prompts legitimate questions about whose security takes priority.
The Lobito Corridor project illustrates this complexity. Framed by the United States and the European Union as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it links Angola’s Atlantic port city Lobito with mineral-rich regions of southern DRC and Zambia’s Copperbelt, shortening supply chains for critical minerals essential to the global energy transition. Yet Chinese financing formed the core of the corridor’s earlier rehabilitation after Angola’s war and remains embedded in the current project.
African agency is real but constrained by realpolitik and limited capacity.
African governments are not choosing between partners; they are engaging all of them. China, the United States, European and Gulf states, Turkey, and Russia all operate in Africa’s security space.
Africa-wide solidarity is frequently overstated, as endemic weaknesses in Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture demonstrate. Platforms like the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation present opportunities for unity, but decision-making remains largely bilateral. Pressuring African states to “choose sides” is likely to increase insecurity, not reduce it.
The contrast between China’s bundled approach and Western fragmentation is increasingly clear. America’s recent shift from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programming to bilateral health pacts illustrates the problem: while ostensibly valuable, these agreements are siloed, heavily conditioned, and vulnerable to American domestic politics.
By comparison, China offers integrated support packages, including infrastructure, training, security cooperation, and development. These deals are invariably more coherent, despite limited transparency.
This helps explain why China is not widely viewed in Africa as malevolent. Chinese engagement is multifaceted, and despite risks from opaque contracts, power asymmetries, and limited accountability, many Africans see the relationship as offering opportunity. As African publics grow younger and more sceptical of a liberal democratic mirage, and its ability to address economic exclusion and poverty, China’s development trajectory offers a faster track out of hardship.
This pragmatism should not be misread as acquiescence. African agency is real but constrained by realpolitik and limited capacity. Sovereignty is eroded through both Chinese opacity and Western inconsistencies and failures to align with local realities – compounded by power asymmetries in US transactional diplomacy. As conflict in Africa mutates, shaped by extraction, climate stress, and transnational crime, the need for tailored, accountable security partnerships will grow.
The question is how African states can secure the best options available. Considering China a security liability for Africa obscures the harder truth: in a power-driven world, Africa is navigating a crowded marketplace in a context of burgeoning needs. Sovereignty depends less on who shows up and more on the terms agreed and who sets them.
About the authors
Isel van Zyl
Isel van Zyl is a researcher and project manager specialising in violent extremism, conflict, and human security.
Piers Pigou
Piers Pigou is an independent consultant who has lived and worked in South Africa since 1992 for a range of organisations.
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