China, explained.

Anthony Albanese and Xi Jinping (@AlboMP/X)

Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and China’s President Xi Jinping (@AlboMP/X)

The Chinese readout of Albanese’s visit

The warm words evident in state media coverage were not to the exclusion of continued points of friction.

Carolin Kautz

21 July 20254 min read

Across the board, the Chinese state media reported on Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to the country last week in a positive light. Even the Global Times, an English language Chinese newspaper known for its often-hawkish coverage of foreign policy issues, praised Albanese’s trip and relations with Australia. The fact that Albanese was in China for six days was positively noted, with the paper stating that the trip was “extraordinarily long compared with Australian state visits over the past decade and marks a normalisation of bilateral relations”. A commentary in the People’s Daily offered similar praise, saying the complementarities of the Australian and the Chinese economy made for advantages in mutual trade.

Overall, the Chinese coverage was reflective of the charm offensive that China has lately engaged in with other countries in the region. The readouts offered from the meetings of Albanese with different Chinese leading figures, including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and head of the standing committee of China’s National People’s Congress, Zhao Leji, were all positive. Xi stressed the improvement in the relations between the countries and the Chinese press called it a “turn-around”.

But the continued concerns in the relationship were evident in the reporting, too, even if not emphasised. Both the Chinese-language reporting of state-owned television channel CCTV and the English reporting of the People’s Dailyrefer to China’s hope that “Australia would treat Chinese enterprises fairly, addressing issues regarding market access and investment reviews”. A similar point shines through in the announcement by China’s Ministry of Commerce of an agreed review mechanism for the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA). The notice among others expresses the need for both sides to work towards “raising the level of liberalisation and facilitate investments”.

In foreign relations, perception is at least as important as indisputable facts and moods shape relations.

Coming from the Chinese government, these statements do not refer to a further opening of the Chinese market for foreign direct investments. Rather, the Chinese government is tacitly concerned about the perception of limits to Chinese investment into Australia, for example through foreign investment reviews. This is particularly relevant for areas like energy resources and green development as well as “cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence and life sciences” that Li Qiang proposed as areas for cooperation. At a CEO roundtable, Li also called for creating a “stronger synergy for development” between the two countries.

In contrast to some discussions in the Australian media and analysis of the outcomes of the visit in Australia, Chinese reporting was a bit sparse on detail about the agreements made, MOUs signed and policy dialogues established. These more specific aspects are largely left to the joint statement that both sides issued together. However, that is not unusual for Chinese reporting of foreign visits and should not be seen as a bad sign. On the contrary, the reasonably extensive coverage in Chinese media and the positive op-eds in publications like the Global Times and the People’s Daily point to China extending its recent charm offensive to Australia as well.

Technology areas can be potentially challenging for relations because they are regarded as part of critical infrastructure. Australia (like other governments) considers them relevant for its national security and can therefore choose to limit foreign investment in these fields. If the Chinese government believes that Chinese companies are singled out in this process, this can be a potential future challenge for the relations between the two countries.

In such a situation, it is beside the point whether there is actual evidence for Chinese companies being singled out in investment review processes or not. In foreign relations, perception is at least as important as indisputable facts and moods shape relations. At the moment, Chinese statements about fair and equal investment environments are largely a side note to the overall positive coverage of Albanese’s visit and trade relations with Australia.

Nevertheless, the Australian government has a tricky issue to manage here. National security concerns need to be carefully weighed against the value of deepened trade relations and perceptions of policy decisions. This is especially the case in the field of green energy and technologies because the challenge of climate change is too big and existential for either country to circumvent it. To give both Australian and Chinese businesses and interest groups more security, it might be time for a clearer and more strategic approach of the Australian government to foreign investment especially in the field of critical infrastructure and green technologies. The “Policy Dialogue on Steel Decarbonisation” that both sides agreed upon is a starting point for this, but more work needs to be done in that regard and clarity over the policy towards Chinese investment in Australia is increasingly required.

About the author

Carolin Kautz

Carolin Kautz holds a PhD in contemporary China studies with a political science focus from the University of Goettingen/Germany.

Topics

China Australia