China, explained.
Conventional ICBMs have great value as first-strike platforms which could severely degrade Australian warfighting capability at the outset of a broader conflict (Getty Images Plus)
And with it, threaten the logic of the US alliance.
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Conventional ICBMs could end Australia’s geographic sanctuaryConventional ICBMs could end Australia’s geographic sanctuary
Recent assessments argue that the world is on the cusp of a “new missile age”. The use of cheap drones might be the focus of conflicts in Ukraine and with Iran, but these weapons typically fly hundreds of kilometres. The far-reaching threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles looms over thousands of kilometres.
This goes beyond the Cold War concern about nuclear-armed ICBMs. The fresh concern relates to the use of long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads. Iran’s attempt to fire on the distant US base in Diego Garcia last week – albeit with intermediate-range ballistic missiles – was a foretaste of the kind of long-range threats posed.
This matters deeply for Australian security. The country’s distance from potential threats has provided insulation from most forms of long-range strike. After initial victories over Imperial Japan in the Second World War, for instance, Australia served as a critical springboard for offensives north into the Pacific precisely because it provided sanctuary for troops to train, rest and re-equip. America’s force posture in Australia has expanded in recent years in part because of the same protection that distance has provided.
But conventional ICBMs will weaken and potentially remove the sanctuary provided by geography. As China develops and brings into service its own conventional ICBM, the DF-27, this is not a theoretical issue for Australia.
Alliances may be easier to establish and manage due to shared values, but at the core they are about value not values.
Such weapons have great value as first-strike platforms which could severely degrade Australian warfighting capability at the outset of a broader conflict. This could involve attacks on key bases in Australia that enable US military activity in the region, such as Pine Gap or North West Cape, used for submarine communications. Australian policymakers are alive to the need for integrated air and missile defence, but there is still the threat, to paraphrase Stanley Baldwin, that the missile will always get through.
The threat of a destructive precision ICBM attack on Australia would also provide China with a powerful tool for coercion. China has other options for coercing Australia, but to date they have not had much success. Its economic campaign against Australia is evidence of this. Chinese action over Taiwan or in the South China Sea would also coerce Australia by disrupting its sea lines of communication. However, due to the interconnected nature of maritime trade, this disruption would necessarily be general, and not simply targeted at Australia. Conventional ICBMs, by contrast, offer a means for coercion through credible threats to the Australian mainland alone.
Most crucially, conventional ICBMs will reach a level of precision by which they remove the physical sanctuary provided by Australia’s location. This has profound effects for any military, as safe rear areas allow for force generation, both in peacetime and in wartime. It is this logistical capability that has so many times determined victory or defeat in conflict. As the saying goes, infantry wins battles, but logistics wins wars.
This will erode the advantage of Australia’s location. If that geographic sanctuary is threatened or eliminated altogether, so too will America’s rationale for deployment. It means this new missile age may strike at a planning assumption which has undergirded Australia’s defence policy for decades.
Australia has sought since the inception of the ANZUS alliance to keep its “great and powerful friend” engaged in the region. But Australia’s partnership with the US is based squarely on Canberra’s military utility to Washington, not the rhetoric of shared values or democratic systems. This utility is, in turn, based in huge part on the sanctuary provided by Australia’s geography. If this sanctuary is eroded, the foundational reasons for the alliance will follow suit.
Alliances may be easier to establish and manage due to shared values, but at the core they are about value not values.
About the author
David Vallance
David Vallance is a Research Associate in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute.
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