For Pacific Island countries, securing enough money to deal with the consequences of climate change has proved an arduous task. Despite facing existential threats from rising seas and collapsing fisheries, the region has struggled to tap into the world’s largest multilateral climate fund. The Green Climate Fund, launched a decade ago with a promise to deliver assistance to the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries, has earned a reputation for being slow, distant, and difficult to work with.
But a small change might make a big difference.
The fund is promising to open regional offices, which could potentially include the Pacific. This would locate decision-makers closer to where the need is greatest. The plan involves shifting existing regional desks out of headquarters in South Korea to help improve responsiveness and processing times. A feasibility study points to potential savings from reduced travel, lower staffing costs, and faster project turnaround.
In an era of shrinking budgets for sustainable development, a practical reform that pays for itself offers rare value.
Bids will then be scored on transport connectivity, telecommunication and digital infrastructure, diplomatic representation, and the presence of other international agencies.
The GCF was created with a lean structure to channel money through a vast network of partners rather than directly delivering projects itself. This model has kept overheads low. But it has left the Fund removed from realities on the ground.
In the Pacific, navigating the Fund’s cumbersome procedures has been especially punishing. Projects incur high delivery costs. Economies of scale are small. Administrative capacity is limited. All of which means applications are slow and costly.
The Fund’s “direct access” mechanism, which is designed to empower countries by funding local actors, has struggled to gain traction in the region. The result is that most financing ends up routed through large institutions such as the World Bank.
Two years ago, I examined the GCF’s record in the Pacific and concluded that while it was an important source of finance, its performance fell short. Its most productive years had been early on, when Australia, the region’s largest donor, helped design the institution and co-chaired its board. However, that influence vanished after the Morrison government withdrew Australia from the GCF in 2018, and funding to the region soon declined.
Australia has since re-engaged, pledging $50 million in 2023 and linking its support to improved results in the Pacific. This amount seems too token to have bought Australia much influence over the Fund’s priorities. Yet, there are signs that change might be underway.
So far this year, the Fund has approved a record US$200 million to the Pacific, not including multi-country projects that also cover other regions. Much of this funding is still channelled through large institutions, including US$107 million for a regional fisheries resilience program managed by Conservation International. But direct access has also started to take hold in recent years, with support reaching regional bodies such as the Pacific Community, alongside two national-level projects in Fiji and Cook Islands.
For a region frustrated by the slow delivery of projects, the scale-up is a significant milestone regardless of the funding channel.
GCF has also strengthened its engagement with the region. Executive Director Mafalda Duarte attended last year’s Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Cook Islands, and in July, held its board meeting in Papua New Guinea. Paired with rising financial commitments, these signals suggest that the Pacific is becoming a genuine priority.
The Pacific has pressed for a greater GCF presence and eligible developing countries have until mid-September to bid for hosting rights for regional offices. A GCF presence could be transformational for the region. Of course, having a local office will not fix every problem. But it could help embed “Pacific literacy” into GCF processes, make it easier for countries to navigate the accreditation required for direct funding, offer assistance to craft competitive proposals, and more easily adjust projects as needs evolve.
Prospective hosts must meet standards for workplace conditions and healthcare coverage. Bids will then be scored on transport connectivity, telecommunication and digital infrastructure, diplomatic representation, and the presence of other international agencies. The ability to offer financial or in-kind support will also be examined.
These measures tilt the scales towards larger, wealthier countries at the expense of small, more remote ones. Only a handful of Pacific candidates appear viable, including Fiji, Palau, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. Of these, Fiji is expected to bid.
The signs are positive that GCF is indeed prioritising the Pacific. But sustaining this focus is far from certain. Prompted by its major donors, the Fund is chasing scale. Its ambition to ramp up its portfolio to US$50 billion in investments by 2030 pulls it towards emerging markets where projects are larger and easier to deliver. A volume-driven approach could sideline smaller countries with some of the most pressing needs.
For now, funding for the Pacific is rising, reforms point to faster delivery, and senior GCF leadership is showing stronger engagement. The next test is whether the Fund can establish a lasting presence in the region and expand its delivery over time, especially providing greater direct access for national Pacific entities.
Should this progress take root, Australia needs to be prepared to match it with serious financial backing at the next replenishment for the Fund.
