Prabowo Subianto, sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president in 2024, has wasted no time in promoting his ambitious foreign policy agenda. Just six months in, he sent Foreign Minister Sugiono to Brazil to convey Indonesia’s interest in joining BRICS, with their accession accepted by the bloc three months later. Sugiono also met with President Xi Jinping in China, resulting in a controversial joint statement that tacitly acknowledged Beijing’s maritime territorial claim in the South China Sea.
At the same time, Prabowo also advanced engagement with the United States. In his first speech at the UN General Assembly, Prabowo made a call to safeguard Israel’s security before achieving a lasting peace in Gaza, an unprecedented statement in Indonesian foreign affairs recognising Israel’s interest. Prabowo also agreed to participate in the International Stabilisation Force, with potentially as many as 8,000 peacekeepers preparing to deploy to Gaza, and accepted President Donald Trump’s invitation to join the newly created Board of Peace, which eventually sparked heavy criticism at home.
By stepping up engagement with both the United States and China, Prabowo has attempted to pursue “multi-alignment” in his foreign policy. This approach shifts Indonesia’s traditional “non-aligned” position, which prohibits close alignment with any great powers and instead aims to craft cooperation with like-minded countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Global South. Prabowo has explicitly embraced this shift. In front of thousands of governors and mayors this month, Prabowo forcefully argued that, “if we want to be truly non-bloc, if we want to befriend everyone, that means we are on our own. If we are threatened or attacked, nobody is going to help us.”
For Prabowo, engaging with multiple great powers is a key step to establishing what he calls “good neighbour foreign policy”. Prabowo justifies his approach by arguing that world politics is hostile and, “the strong will rule and the weak will suffer”. From this viewpoint, he espouses a foreign policy that enhances good relations with all neighbours and great powers, because “a thousand friends is too few, one enemy is too many”.
But can Indonesia actually abandon its non-alignment position in an uncertain geopolitical environment, and considering Indonesia’s diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities?
Prabowo faces other problems with multi-alignment, not least that it does not bring the same benefits as active alignment.
It is important to note that multi-alignment would complicate Indonesia’s relationship with both the United States and China. Indonesia may be forced to take a side if great power competition between the two is heightened. An unstable international order means the likelihood of that scenario is significantly increased. In recent years, great powers have demonstrated less restrained behaviour in violating international rules and laws. Perhaps they may also be less restrained in bullying weaker countries in order to achieve their foreign policy interests.
The United States has demonstrated this behaviour. When the Trump administration announced 32% tariffs on Indonesian goods, Prabowo quickly negotiated and offered concessions that would require Indonesia to adjust many of its policies, including around access to critical minerals and commitments to buy Boeing jets. Trump even demanded that Indonesia buy US surveillance drones and publicly announce it, which Indonesia declined to do.
Prabowo faces other problems with multi-alignment, not least that it does not bring the same benefits as active alignment. As an example, great powers will not be keen to transfer military technologies or resources to countries that are not deemed trusted allies. There is also a “perception problem”. If Indonesia engages deeply with multiple great powers it will need to explain its rationale to other key partners, including ASEAN members as well as its domestic audience. This could jeopardise Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN and complicate efforts to resolve existing regional problems, particularly the South China Sea dispute.
Over-commitment will also pose an issue. To support multi-alignment, Indonesia must engage with many diplomatic initiatives, yet it has limited financial resources and institutional support. This could create diplomatic fatigue in Indonesia’s foreign ministry and force the country to play only minor roles in regional initiatives rather than setting the rules.
In this environment, Prabowo needs to consider the political realities behind his multi-alignment venture. Indonesia is a middle power with limited diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities to influence and steer global politics. A multi-alignment that does not consider this reality could weaken Indonesia’s role in ASEAN, in particular on the unresolved issues of the Myanmar peace process, the Thai-Cambodia border crisis, and the South China Sea dispute. At the same time, Prabowo’s engagement with Trump could trap Indonesia in Trump’s personal orbit without any tangible benefits for the country.
Prabowo's pursuit of multi-alignment needs a clear direction, a strong rationale, and a risk management strategy for any engagement with great powers. In practical terms, that will mean less time spent on pragmatic non-alignment strategies and more spent on institutional support for the foreign ministry.
