China, explained.
China’s permanent representative to the United Nations Fu Cong votes against a draft resolution on the Strait of Hormuz at United Nations Security Council meeting in New York, 7 April 2026 (Liao Pan/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images)
China’s UN veto on a Strait of Hormuz resolution was a calculation driven by domestic pressure and pragmatism.
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Iran crisis puts China’s UN diplomacy to the testIran crisis puts China’s UN diplomacy to the test
China and Russia this week vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz crisis, which began when Iran closed the Strait in response to US and Israeli attacks almost six weeks ago. The politicking around the Bahrain-led draft, and in parallel to the debate at the UN, highlights a change in China’s engagement with international crises, and underscored the pragmatism that guides its actions.
The UNSC resolution was a watered-down draft, stripped of references to the authorisation of the use of force or binding enforcement during drafting at the insistence of China and Russia. Lines on proportional and defensive efforts were added in place. The resolution was explicitly not about resolving the crisis, but focused on twin goals: “to deter attempts to close, obstruct or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz” and support for “the escort of merchant and commercial vessels.”
China still chose to exercise its veto and such a move carries a cost. By definition, obstructing the working of the Security Council serves to further degrade the utility and legitimacy of the only global peace and security platform where China has equal footing to the United States. This makes understanding China’s context and explanation of the veto worth examining carefully.
China emphasised two key concerns, while managing any potential blowback by referring to its China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative and chastising Iran.
To begin with, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong made explicit reference to the 2011 case of Libya – where China cast an abstention vote for an operation that escalated to regime change removing Muammar Gaddafi – citing China’s perennial fear of “the veneer for unauthorised military operations.” President Donald Trump’s social media threats of “blasting Iran into oblivion” and to “[o]pen the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell,” fed China’s about the any resolution being used to justify potential regime change.
It is costly for China to cast a veto. By definition, it degrades the only global security platform where China has equal footing to the United States.
Second, China also emphasised that the resolution failed to give a “full picture of the conflict” with its “one-sided condemnation”, blaming both the United States and Israel for launching unauthorised military strikes, signalling concern that the resolution could provide legal cover for continued military action.
The vote at the UNSC took place at a critical moment for China’s positioning in the Middle East. When the conflict began on 28 February, Beijing was relatively better able to tolerate the immediate shock from spiking oil prices better than most other countries, at least in the short term. The increasing electrification of the Chinese economy, its vast domestic coal resources, strategic oil reserves and the fact that China-owned vessels continued to transit the Strait, afforded China some distance from immediate economic pressures. Moreover, despite the killing of Ali Khamenei and other high-ranking leaders, the Iranian state apparatus proved resilient, the swift change of leadership providing continuity for China’s bilateral diplomacy.
However, a prolonged conflict, possibly extending over several months and escalating into a ground invasion, would have posed serious risks, prompting China to become more involved in de-escalation efforts. China’s economy is in no position to weather a global recession with ease. Persistently weak domestic demand means that exports remain essential for absorbing industrial output, sustaining economic growth, and supporting employment. A decline in external demand, combined with disruptions in access to key industrial and agricultural inputs, could therefore undermine a critical pillar of the economy.
The conflict’s continuation also risked further delaying Trump’s visit to China, which had already been pushed back from April to May. For Beijing, stabilising relations with Washington remains a priority, not least to gain time to strengthen its economy against the possibility of future US sanctions. Conversely, hosting the US President while active fighting continued risks signalling implicit support for, or acquiescence to, US military actions. In addition, China still hadn’t resolved the challenge of how to protect or evacuate the hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals in the region.
China also took action outside the UNSC based on its ongoing relationship with Iran. We’ve heard credible accounts that China played at least an important role coordinating with both Tehran and Washington ahead of the present Pakistan-brokered ceasefire. This was a necessary step to prevent escalation and create the foundation for what will undoubtedly be a difficult diplomatic process.
The next challenge for China will be to sustain such levels of engagement. The conflict is far from resolved.
About the authors
Courtney J Fung
Dr Courtney J. Fung is a Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute, an associate professor in Security Studies in the School of International Studies at Macquarie University, and an associate at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University.
Andrea Ghiselli
Andrea Ghiselli is a Ph.
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