Monitoring without mandate: Can sanctions succeed outside a UN framework?

The new “multilateral team” watching North Korea faces legitimacy challenges.

Nika Pasko

18 March 20253 min read

Russia last year exercised its UN Security Council veto to put a stop to reports about North Korea’s sanction-busting efforts. As a result, in October, 11 countries – Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States – joined to create the “Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team” to continue investigating sanctions violations.

The grouping held its first meeting last month in Washington, DC – little noticed among the outpouring of news in the early days of the Trump administration. Yet the meeting was significant, as this case signals a potential trend, where the dysfunction of UN multilateral sanctions mechanisms may lead to unilateral efforts to monitor sanctions regimes. But these attempts have their own challenges.

The first signs of a rift in the multilateral system had become evident in 2018, when Russia called for a gradual review of North Korea sanctions, highlighting their limited effectiveness in addressing Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. A year later, Moscow and Beijing advocated for the partial lifting of sanctions, arguing that they exacerbated the humanitarian situation in North Korea.

Given that violations occur on the governments’ initiative, domestic authorities are unlikely to punish the entities involved.

Since 2022, Russia has been actively involved in sanctions violations by importing weapons and deploying troops from North Korea to support its invasion of Ukraine. Vetoing the mandate renewal of what was known as the 1718 Committee’s Panel of Experts was a logical move for Russia, as keeping the panel running no longer aligned with its interests.

With the international community needing to address ongoing sanctions violations but unable to act quickly within the UN’s framework, the G7 countries plus Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and South Korea launched the MSMT. It could become a model for similar stand-offs in future if the UNSC negotiations on other sanctions regimes end in a deadlock.

However, bodies like the MSMT face challenges that could impede their work. Unilateral trade and financial sanctions will be ineffective if Russia and North Korea obstruct maritime patrols or use non-US dollar financial institutions, for example. And given that violations occur on the governments’ initiative, domestic authorities are unlikely to punish the entities involved.

The lack of UN legitimacy for the MSMT may lead other countries to disregard its findings. Moreover, potential secondary sanctions imposed by Western countries in response to MSMT findings could fuel anti-Western sentiment. Addressing this problem and getting legitimacy, especially among states with economic ties to sanctioned countries, is a key to making non-UN monitoring teams effective.

There is an opportunity to use initiatives associated with Track II diplomacy as a tool for building trust with other countries and improving compliance among potential sanctions violators. Monitoring states should actively engage with foreign businesses and individuals to explain the consequences of non-compliance and expand their networks to make monitoring more effective. To maintain the UN principle of inclusivity, non-UN bodies should let other states provide suggestions for improving the sanctions regime and encourage them to share crucial data. Western countries, pivotal in maintaining sanctions, should create a broad coalition with developing countries. These nations are often exploited as jurisdictions for illicit activities by sanctioned states, making their cooperation crucial.

Both UN and non-UN monitoring bodies should consider the mechanisms for reviewing sanctions to make them more flexible. It is crucial to mitigate the impact of sanctions on ordinary citizens, otherwise people can become convinced that sanctioning countries are responsible for economic hardships. In North Korea, sanctions had negative effects by impeding the work of humanitarian organisations.

The absence of sanctions review can increase risk tolerance in sanctioned countries, making them more prone to aggressive actions.

The MSMT and other potential non-UN monitoring bodies must consider these challenges to ensure effective and flexible implementation of UNSC resolutions.

About the author

Nika Pasko

Nika Pasko is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University.

Topics

North Korea United Nations