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Myanmar, explained.
Philippines Foreign Secretary Tessa Lazaro, the 2026 ASEAN Chair special envoy for Myanmar, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila this month (Aaron Favila/Getty Images)
Five years after the Five-Point-Consensus, Naypyidaw’s defiance has pushed ASEAN to redraw its own benchmarks for progress.
Myanmar and ASEAN: Five points, but little consensusMyanmar and ASEAN: Five points, but little consensus
About the author
Moe Thuzar
Moe Thuzar is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
Five years ago, in April 2021, ASEAN heads of state and government adopted the Five-Point-Consensus in response to the coup in Myanmar. This came with the concurrence of then-coup leader, (Opens in new window) Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
Naypyidaw then made protestations, qualifying its agreement to the document – and now insists that the Five-Point-Consensus is a statement (Opens in new window) issued by ASEAN with parliament this month adopting a motion rejecting the plan.
Naypyidaw’s rejection amounts to its hardest pushback against ASEAN to date. That gambit backfired to some extent, as ASEAN foreign ministers, during an informal meeting with Naypyidaw’s foreign minister in Bangkok on 12 July, reaffirmed the importance of implementing the priorities set out in the Five-Point-Consensus that Naypyidaw had either ignored or passed off as partially addressed – ceasing violence, particularly against civilians, and providing humanitarian access without discrimination.
Yet the Bangkok informal meeting seems to have established a new layer of engagement with Naypyidaw. This follows concern from a range of Myanmar stakeholders (Opens in new window) about Naypyidaw using bilateral channels to assert and set conditions on ASEAN’s planned meetings with them as part of the mandate for the ASEAN chair’s special envoy.
The past five years of Naypyidaw’s recalcitrance have shown that ASEAN's tough talk may not fundamentally change the regime’s behaviour on the ground.
After the Bangkok informal meeting, the 2026 special envoy, the Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Secretary Tess Lazaro, along with her Thai counterpart Sihasak Phuangketkeow, met several ethnic and political stakeholders from Myanmar. Lazaro then met separately (Opens in new window)with the foreign minister of the National Unity Government (NUG), and with members of Naypyidaw’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee, echoing the practice of past special envoys.
Thailand, having hosted the meetings, is positioning itself as a bridge between ASEAN and Myanmar ahead of its 2028 turn as ASEAN chair. This warrants monitoring, as a decision is still pending on a proposal by Malaysia in 2025 to provide a longer-term mandate for the special envoy, beyond the present one-year term. ASEAN’s attempts to appoint a special envoy in 2021 were affected by Naypyidaw's efforts to influence the consideration of candidates, which led to the current compromise of linking the special envoy’s term to the annual ASEAN Chair.
ASEAN’s decision to make future engagement contingent on measurable progress (Opens in new window) now requires further detailing of specific indicators. This is not new. In 2022, ASEAN heads of state and government called for an implementation plan with a specific timeline (Opens in new window) to give the broad framework of the Five-Point-Consensus greater effect.
Police in Yangon on 19 July 2026, the 79th Martyrs' Day that marks the anniversary of the assassination of independence leaders, including general Aung San, father of the deposed and currently imprisoned leader Aung San Suu Kyi (Sai Aung Main/AFP via Getty Images)
The Five-Point-Consensus is ASEAN’s only intervention mechanism for Myanmar, using regional diplomacy rather than more direct measures. The current restriction of Myanmar’s attendance at summits and foreign ministers’ meetings to a non-political representative is directly linked to Naypyidaw’s disregard for the Five-Point-Consensus. The ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Manila in July has kept Myanmar on the regional agenda (Opens in new window).
The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s annual State of Southeast Asia surveys (Opens in new window) have tracked options for moving forward on Myanmar issues since 2022. The strongest regional preference is to engage in independent dialogue with all Myanmar stakeholders, including the NUG, to build trust.
By linking future engagement with Naypyidaw to demonstrable progress (Opens in new window) on the Five-Point-Consensus, ASEAN seems to have moved the goalposts. Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak has proposed four indicators of progress (Opens in new window): a wider humanitarian space (still prioritising a central role for the ASEAN humanitarian assistance coordinating centre), a reduction (rather than cessation) of violence, more visible stakeholder engagement, and the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi. However, any benchmark will still require a clearer definition (Opens in new window).
The past five years of Naypyidaw’s recalcitrance have shown that ASEAN’s tough talk may not fundamentally change the regime’s behaviour on the ground. ASEAN members’ attitudes differ (Opens in new window) on engaging Naypyidaw. Some advocate pragmatic engagement – others are concerned about ASEAN’s credibility and centrality if such engagement ignores the many strands of crisis in Myanmar that have developed as a consequence of the 2021 coup. Some try to balance the regional consensus with their interactions with Naypyidaw for bilateral (economic) interests. Naypyidaw also operates on a different geopolitical calculus of survival, diluting ASEAN’s diplomatic leverage by seeking closer political, security and economic interactions with Beijing, Delhi, and Moscow, which have their own interests in Myanmar.
ASEAN’s “talks for talks (Opens in new window)” may facilitate greater access to humanitarian aid delivery (Opens in new window), and Secretary Lazaro is planning a humanitarian mission to Myanmar (Opens in new window). The access granted or denied to her as ASEAN’s envoy may constitute another benchmark for consideration. However, the ability to prise open more space and channels for aid may not yet stretch to ceasing hostilities altogether, or to facilitating the process of (re)building trust repeatedly broken over decades.
