More than four years after the coup in Myanmar, ASEAN’s struggle to address the crisis has not only exposed institutional deadlock but also catalysed a decentralisation of regional diplomacy. While the Five-Point Consensus remains the bloc’s formal position, a new reality has emerged: parallel diplomacy. Conducted through informal, bilateral or minilateral channels, these efforts operate outside the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s consensus-based framework, revealing a deeper structural drift. While some of these initiatives have constructively supplemented official channels, others bypass the bloc altogether, eroding the coherence of ASEAN’s collective response.
Not all parallel initiatives are alike. Some, such as Indonesia’s quiet facilitation with resistance actors, have constructively extended ASEAN’s diplomatic reach.
What is unfolding is not a temporary adaptation but a reconfiguration of Southeast Asian diplomacy, in which national imperatives increasingly outweigh regional cohesion. Thailand’s efforts speak to this shift. In June 2023, it hosted talks with Myanmar’s military regime under the guise of humanitarian engagement. The meeting sidestepped ASEAN mechanisms and was boycotted by Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. In December 2024, Thailand held another “informal consultation”, this time attended by the foreign ministers of Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, while other ASEAN members sent lower-level representatives. The composition of the meeting suggested a growing willingness among some members to participate in both formal and informal tracks, and tacitly endorsed Thailand’s assumption of a more active role in addressing the crisis. Publicly, attendees reaffirmed support for ASEAN unity. Privately, the message was clear: improvisation had replaced collective strategy.
This fragmentation became more visible during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in January 2025. The Philippines called for a new framework, while Vietnam advocated for the inclusion of ethnic armed organisations in future talks – a position long considered too sensitive. Previously, as 2023 ASEAN Chair, Indonesia had conducted more than 145 engagements as of September 2023. These diverging approaches have not yet produced tangible progress nor outright division within ASEAN, but they have resulted in an incoherent mosaic of national responses that may weaken ASEAN’s collective leverage.
Not all parallel initiatives are alike. Some, such as Indonesia’s quiet diplomacy with resistance actors, have constructively extended ASEAN’s diplomatic reach, providing informal backchannels where official dialogue remains blocked. Others, notably Thailand’s minilateral consultations, have drawn both criticism and cautious support from ASEAN members, reflecting a pragmatic turn towards engagement over paralysis. Yet these efforts remain loosely coordinated and procedurally detached from ASEAN’s formal mandate, creating ambiguity in the bloc’s overall posture. The Myanmar junta has exploited this ambiguity by selectively engaging with states willing to offer a platform for legitimacy while dismissing criticism from others. This uneven engagement has enabled Naypyidaw to reinforce its position and erode ASEAN’s coherence without facing sustained regional pressure.
The longer this trend persists, the more entrenched it becomes. ASEAN’s diplomatic architecture – built around consensus and non-interference, is not designed for sustained crisis management.What has emerged instead is a form of strategic compartmentalisation: different member states pursuing different goals through different means, all under the façade of unity. Thailand’s engagement on border stability, Malaysia’s advocacy for political inclusion involving all stakeholders, and Indonesia’s quiet facilitation with resistance actors illustrate how national agendas now operate with limited coordination.
The implications extend beyond ASEAN. China has deepened its influence over the conflict by acting bilaterally, both with Naypyidaw and with ASEAN members. Its reported pressure on Thailand to act against cross-border criminal syndicates, coupled with its investments in contested areas like San State, reflects a dual strategy: selective engagement and strategic encroachment. As ASEAN’s cohesion weakens, the space for external actors to shape regional outcomes widens.
Parallel diplomacy is not inherently illegitimate. In complex crises, informal channels can serve as essential tools of engagement.
The Myanmar junta’s plan to hold elections in late 2025 has further sharpened divisions within ASEAN. Malaysia and Singapore have publicly questioned the credibility of the proposed polls, citing ongoing violence, the absence of inclusive dialogue and a lack of meaningful political reform. Thailand has emphasised the need for an inclusive electoral process but stopped short of criticising the junta directly. Cambodia has signalled its engagement by expressing interest in sending election observers. These divergences reflect competing visions of how ASEAN should respond to authoritarian resilience in its midst as well as the challenges of presenting a unified front.
Parallel diplomacy is not inherently illegitimate. In complex crises, informal channels can serve as essential tools of engagement. But their proliferation, absent coordination or strategic vision, risks substituting action with ambiguity. The more ASEAN members rely on these alternatives, the less relevance the bloc’s formal mechanisms retain.
To reclaim agency, ASEAN must confront its internal contradictions. Institutional reform is essential – not only in terms of decision-making but also in how diplomacy is conceptualised and practised. A more flexible engagement architecture, capable of accommodating differentiated strategies while maintaining coherence, is urgently needed. This includes giving a more formal role to informal diplomatic channels – such as dialogues involving academics, policy experts and government representatives acting in a personal capacity – so that these Track 1.5 and Track II efforts are better coordinated with ASEAN’s official response.
Equally, ASEAN must broaden its diplomatic imagination. A state-centric approach cannot adequately address a crisis driven by overlapping political, ethnic and humanitarian breakdowns. Greater engagement with non-state actors, including ethnic political groups, civil society, and diaspora networks, is not a departure from ASEAN principles but a necessary evolution of them. Relevance, in this context, should be understood as the ability to influence outcomes, coordinate regional responses, uphold legitimacy, and serve as a credible diplomatic convenor.
The Myanmar crisis has laid bare the limits of a regional order built on inertia and procedural restraint. Parallel diplomacy, in its current form, is both a symptom and a driver of ASEAN’s strategic drift. Unless there is clearer coordination and renewed collective purpose, the bloc risks becoming an arena of competing national manoeuvres dressed in regional language. The test of ASEAN’s centrality is no longer whether it can speak with one voice, but whether it can coordinate many, without losing the plot.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of his workplace and affiliated institutions.
