Myanmar, explained.
Myanmar's Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stands in a vehicle as he attends a ceremony to mark the country's 78th Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on 27 March 2023. (AFP/Getty)
The regime is in deep trouble but it is best not to be too optimistic about an early resolution of the conflict.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
Myanmar's “failed junta” turns fourMyanmar's “failed junta” turns four
Activists, pundits and even some academic commentators have described the military power grab in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 as a “failed coup”. It is not always clear precisely what they mean by this, but the inescapable fact remains that the self-styled State Administration Council (SAC) led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is still in power after four tumultuous years.
The opposition movement has made remarkable progress in military terms, but it is still divided over strategic objectives.
The regime has lost large swathes of territory around the country’s periphery, including control of two regional military commands, in the north and west of the country. It is under increasing challenge from ethnic armed organisations (EAO) and forces owing allegiance to the shadow National Unity Government (NUG). The country’s economy is in ruins, nearly 35 per cent of the population lives in poverty and more than 3.5 million people have been displaced.
To that extent, it can be claimed that the military regime has “failed” to govern Myanmar, defeat its enemies and consolidate its position. Yet, despite repeated predictions of its imminent demise, it is still there.
In August 2023, for example, the leaders of three major EAOs declared that the junta would fall “soon”. In late 2023 and early 2024, when a coalition of EAOs and supporters of the NUG inflicted several major military defeats on the armed forces (or Tatmadaw) in northern and western Myanmar, the civil war was said to be “at a tipping point”. The junta was described as “mortally wounded”, indeed, that it was “on the brink of collapse”.
Needless to say, those claims proved to be rather premature. Most reflected wishful thinking more than any objective analysis. Even now, 12 months later, some observers are insisting that the junta is “in terminal decline”.
Despite its many woes, the junta has proven surprisingly resilient. It still controls Myanmar’s economic heartland and the bulk of the population. It has the support of Russia and China, both of which are providing arms and diplomatic protection. The junta can evade most sanctions against it and commands significant export revenues. It has also demonstrated that, when required, it can be flexible, and will strike ceasefire deals with its opponents.
The opposition movement has made remarkable progress in military terms, but it is still divided over strategic objectives. The EAOs and NUG share the goal of destroying the SAC but beyond that, little has been agreed. Military victories have yielded large quantities of arms and ammunition, but the opposition still suffers from a lack of resources. The NUG has been unable to win formal recognition or lethal aid from any foreign governments.
It is difficult to predict what will happen in 2025. Myanmar has always had the ability to surprise observers. One critical factor to watch, however, will be the continuing loyalty and cohesion of the armed forces, which holds the key to the junta's survival. There are clearly deep fissures in the Tatmadaw but, to date, it has maintained its internal discipline and, so-called “defectors” aside, obeyed the junta’s orders.
The junta was described as “mortally wounded”, indeed, that it was “on the brink of collapse”. Needless to say, those claims proved to be rather premature.
In that regard, however, the activation last year of a dormant conscription law constitutes a major gamble. For decades, great pains have been taken to shape and control the thinking of the armed forces rank and file. So the introduction of more than 20,000 resentful and potentially mutinous men and women, presumably all trained and armed, must be considered a real risk. It suggests that the junta’s military manpower shortage remains a serious problem.
As veteran Myanmar-watcher Bertil Lintner has pointed out, Beijing has emerged as perhaps the only foreign government with the will and the means to influence developments in the country. This is purely out of self-interest. It is keen to safeguard its volatile southern border, to protect its investments, including its economic corridor to Myanmar’s west coast, and to retain access to the country’s natural resources.
Beijing has no particular wish to see a democratic government emerge in Myanmar. It is prepared to talk with any government in Naypyidaw that can guarantee a degree of stability and predictability. To this end, it has been prepared to speak with both sides, seeking to take advantage of their problems to promote its own strategic and economic interests. Lately, it appears to have decided that the junta is not going anywhere and is thus worth supporting.
Meanwhile, the rest of the international community seems content to wring its hands, refer to largely ineffectual sanctions and decry the junta’s atrocities (while remaining conspicuously quiet on the assassination of unarmed civil servants by urban resistance groups). Meeting in Malaysia earlier this month, ASEAN came up with nothing new, reminding the junta that it has little to fear from foreign governments, who wish to keep the conflict at arm’s length.
There is no denying that the junta is in deep trouble on many fronts. It has failed to achieve most of its stated objectives. However, in the current circumstances it would be prudent to be cautious, and not to become too optimistic about an early resolution of the conflict. If history has taught us anything since the coup four years ago, it is to be careful about predicting the downfall of the military regime. As the SAC begins its fifth year in power, that is worth keeping in mind.
About the author
Andrew Selth
Dr Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, at Griffith University, Brisbane, and author of numerous books, monographs and articles on Myanmar.
Topics
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
