On the defence front, the Philippines tends to enjoy a relatively healthy share of America’s regional foreign military financing (FMF), but still minimal compared to billions of annual aid enjoyed by US partners in other regions such as the Middle East. Nothing better captures this than the recently-suspended F-16 deal after Manila complained of lack of financial support from the Pentagon.
In fact, the bulk of the Philippines’ modern weapons systems are purchased from other regional partners. South Korea alone accounts for a third of the country’s total defence imports, ranging from fighter jets to warships, while India has been the main source of strategic platforms such as the Brahmos missile system. Japan has been the top source of defence aid for the Philippine Coast Guard, while Europeans are now angling to fill in the gap by offering multi-role fighters, submarines, and warships. Most of the Philippines’ modern Black Hawk helicopters are from Poland.
Aside from regular joint training and the annual FMF aid, America’s most meaningful defence assistance to the Philippines in recent years was stationing the Typhon missile system in the Southeast Asian nation. But it remains to be seen if the Pentagon is open to permanently stationing or transferring the much-vaunted platform to Filipino troops. The alliance with the United States is meaningful, but nowhere near sufficient to cover the Philippines’ expanding defence needs in the face of rapidly rising China.
Ultimately, however, the Marcos Jr administration has also embraced a more multipolar vision of the world that goes beyond the dictates of any superpower. As the Filipino president told his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi during a recent visit to New Delhi: “The Indian vision for multipolarity, which resonates with the Philippine emphasis on strategic agency is no longer an aspiration, it is an exigency [because of] the responsibility of all stakeholders … to play a more active role in upholding, defending, and preserving our rules-based order.”
This echoes sentiments shared by leaders of other key Indo-Pacific middle powers such as French President Emmanuel Macron, who, during his keynote address in the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, emphasised the need for “coalitions of action” to resist “spheres of coercion” under superpowers, and Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba, who, ahead of his resignation, underscored the urgency of US allies becoming more “self-sufficient” amid America’s more isolationist turn.
Instead of fatalism, or succumbing to China’s hegemonic ambitions, frontline regional states such as the Philippines are fast developing a new network of “middle power cooperation” in the Indo-Pacific.