Myanmar, explained.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) meets with Myanmar's military chief Min Aung Hlaing at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow on 4 March 2025 (Pavel Bednyakov/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
Has the junta just struck a deal with Moscow to strengthen its monitoring and military capabilities?
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Russia to boost Myanmar’s imagery intelligenceRussia to boost Myanmar’s imagery intelligence
There is one aspect of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visit to Russia that has largely escaped notice. This was Vladimir Putin’s offer to help Myanmar’s military regime improve its access to satellite imagery. This not only has obvious strategic implications, but it also has direct application to the junta’s conduct of the current civil war.
There has long been speculation that the regime’s military cooperation arrangements with China and India have included the provision of satellite imagery. However, after Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, the United States provided overhead imagery to the Naypyidaw government and to the United Nations to help them assess the level of damage to population centres and affected rural areas. This suggested that Myanmar did not have the capacity to acquire such imagery itself. If it was required, high resolution satellite imagery was also available from commercial firms, such as Google Earth, Digital Globe and Landsat.
Myanmar’s armed forces have doubtless already taken advantage of such sources to build up their photographic coverage of the country and to monitor shifts in the strategic environment. After all, if international organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch could draw on commercial imagery to report on developments in Myanmar, there is no reason why the regime could not do the same. This process is not without its challenges, but even so, useful intelligence can be obtained with the right software and sufficient training. The cost of such material may be a factor, but intelligence to support military operations has always been given a high priority in Myanmar’s scarce foreign exchange.
Since 2021, surveillance drones have been widely deployed for counter-insurgency operations around Myanmar’s periphery.
After the advent of a quasi-civilian government in 2012, Myanmar enjoyed more options to collect and analyse imagery intelligence (IMINT) than ever before. There was an increasingly wide range of satellite imagery available online, both freely and through commercial arrangements. This included high resolution electro-optical photography and infra-red images. In addition, the armed forces were believed to operate about 11 Sky-02A surveillance drones, purchased from China. Another 22 had reportedly been built in Myanmar, designated the Yellow Cat A2. These unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) could carry digital colour and infra-red video cameras.
Between 2013 and 2015, Myanmar purchased a dozen CH-3A UAVs, also from China. The CH-3A was a combat drone, and not the most sophisticated of China’s unmanned platforms, but it was able to perform long-range surveillance missions and had a useful imaging capability. In 2017, for example, the Bangladesh government complained that Myanmar had sent drones over its border to spy on Rohingya refugee movements and, presumably, the rebel Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. After the 2021 coup, CH-3 surveillance drones were spotted over street protests by the civil disobedience movement.
Data derived from such platforms could be used for a wide range of purposes. Apart from the advantages of near or real-time imagery to operational planners conducting reconnaissance or surveillance missions, such sources could also help map-makers and those monitoring population movements, settlement patterns, land use and infrastructure developments. Such projects assumed a high priority under the Thein Sein (2011–15) and Aung San Suu Kyi (2016–20) governments, but all had obvious benefits to intelligence analysts. Since 2021, surveillance drones have been widely deployed for counter-insurgency operations around Myanmar’s periphery.
During Min Aung Hlaing’s latest visit to Moscow, it was announced that Russia had established a joint satellite imagery analysis centre in Myanmar. While the subject was raised in the context of bilateral cooperation on space exploration and satellite technology, it was revealed at the same time that Russia had offered to “share information captured by its reconnaissance satellites with the regime for military purposes”. It is still early days, and the details of the deal are not known, but this step potentially marks a major enhancement of the junta’s ability to monitor developments in and around Myanmar, and to plan its military operations against the country's opposition movement.
About the author
Andrew Selth
Dr Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, at Griffith University, Brisbane, and author of numerous books, monographs and articles on Myanmar.
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