North Korea, explained.
Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump meet in 2018 and 2019 but did not strike a lasting deal on denuclearisation for North Korea (Kremlin, White House Photo)
A Shenzhen meeting on the sidelines of APEC might amount to little – reopening contact, not resolving the nuclear question.
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The last chance for a Trump–Kim summit?The last chance for a Trump–Kim summit?
When Donald Trump said (Opens in new window) on 12 October that he “may” meet Kim Jong-un during his upcoming Asia trip, he revived an overture he has made (Opens in new window) repeatedly (Opens in new window) since returning to office. The possibility of a summit on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen on 18–19 November has renewed speculation about whether the two leaders could resume their personal diplomacy.
For Trump, a meeting could offer an opportunity to demonstrate his dealmaking credentials and secure a foreign-policy achievement. For Kim, it could mark the beginning of a new phase of negotiations in which denuclearisation is no longer the immediate priority, potentially opening the door to sanctions relief and a less confrontational relationship with Washington. Yet despite Trump’s frequent references (Opens in new window) to his rapport with Kim, the North Korean leader is unlikely to agree to a meeting unless Washington is willing to take denuclearisation off the table.
The opening (Opens in new window) of North Korea’s new National Defence Revolution Museum on 11 October offers a glimpse of the position from which Kim might approach renewed talks. The museum displays an array of advanced weapons, including the Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine-launched missiles and drones. The timing of the opening has led some analysts to interpret the exhibition as an effort (Opens in new window) to display North Korea’s military advances and strengthen its leverage ahead of possible negotiations. Regardless of the intent, the weapons on display send a message in their own right.
Kim at the opening of the National Defence Revolution Museum (KCNA via kcnawatch.org)
As of mid-October, Pyongyang continues to ignore US overtures for talks. Kim Yo Jong has explicitly denied (Opens in new window) that any communication is taking place between Pyongyang and Washington, contradicting a remark Trump made in August.
The time available before Trump’s November trip is also limited. Arranging a leader-level summit would require time to coordinate logistics, yet so far there have been only unconfirmed reports (Opens in new window) of a US envoy making a preparatory visit to Shenzhen and Hangzhou. Beijing has also remained quiet on the prospect, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi stating (Opens in new window) that a Trump–Kim summit was “what North Korea and the US should decide,” pledging only China’s “constructive role” in promoting peace, development and stability on the peninsula.
If a meeting does take place, China could benefit from its position as host and potential mediator. Xi Jinping could quietly facilitate arrangements, reinforcing Beijing’s position in North Korea and Korean Peninsula affairs more broadly, which has arguably weakened in recent years as Pyongyang’s diplomatic and military ties with Moscow have deepened.
China’s most useful contribution may be to lower the bar for success. Rather than pushing for a leader-level summit premised on denuclearisation, Beijing could support the resumption of working-level contacts between US and North Korean officials. Taking denuclearisation off the immediate agenda could allow both sides to test each other’s intentions without the pressure of a high-profile encounter. For Beijing, facilitating even this modest step would help reaffirm its diplomatic relevance as a mediator both to the US and Pyongyang.
China’s most useful contribution may be to lower the bar for success.
The main obstacle, however, will likely be persuading North Korea to re-engage with the US. Kim may see little reason to negotiate while US expectations remain incompatible with his own, particularly given the stronger position he believes North Korea’s modernised arsenal affords him. Trump, for his part, may be unwilling to accept a process that offers no visible achievement.
Still, if both leaders can agree on a narrower objective – reopening communication rather than resolving the nuclear question – a meeting in Shenzhen could create an opportunity to reduce tensions.
The political timing adds another layer of urgency. Trump is facing record-low (Opens in new window) approval ratings at home. If Republicans suffer substantial losses in the midterm elections, Trump could face greater domestic constraints on his foreign-policy ambitions. The window for a summit may therefore be narrow, making this potentially the last major opportunity for a Trump–Kim meeting.
About the author
Gabriela Bernal
Dr Gabriela Bernal is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.
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