Russia, explained.
A Shahed-type drone flies in the sky over Kharkiv in Ukraine (Pavlo Pakhomenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
Russia’s intensifying strikes on civilians reflect battlefield frustration, not impending victory.
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For Ukraine’s population, this is the hardest stretch of the warFor Ukraine’s population, this is the hardest stretch of the war
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, Moscow is still fighting for incremental gains in the Donbas, while the Russian economy shows signs of strain. GDP is contracting, oil prices remain depressed, and the federal budget recorded a $22.3 billion deficit in January, nearly half of its full year target. And the Kremlin continues weaponising peace talks.
With Donald Trump pressing for a peace deal by June, both Moscow and Kyiv are keen to project good faith participation in negotiations. For the Kremlin, sustaining that perception carries strategic value.
Vladimir Putin’s winter bombing campaign reflects the limits of Russia’s battlefield progress rather than impending victory. At the same time, Putin continues to receive glowing battlefield reports from his commanders that have at times backfired. In Kupiansk, Russian officials claimed the city had been fully captured, only for Volodymyr Zelensky to appear there days later and publish a video proving otherwise in December.
According to Western officials, Russia sustained roughly 9,000 more battlefield losses in January than it was able to replace, while failing to secure significant territorial gains. Russian fatalities may have reached as high as 35,000 in December. Ukraine wants to increase that to 50,000 a month, far more than Russia can recruit per month, unless it conducts a wider mobilisation.
Moscow appears to believe that sustained strikes will degrade Ukraine’s military capacity while pressure on the population will compel Kyiv’s leadership to sue for peace. The Kremlin believes victory is within reach if it can break the will of the population.
Cheap, mass-produced drones allow Moscow to strike the same facilities repeatedly, exhausting repair crews and critical components faster than they can be replaced.
However, 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian civilians since 2022, with civilian casualties 31% higher than in 2024 and 70% higher than in 2023. After Trump returned to office last year and paused military aid to Ukraine, Kyiv began facing shortages of critical air defence missiles, leaving Ukrainian officials to lament “some air defence systems sometimes stand empty while attacks still need to be repelled”.
In January, Russia launched 4,442 Shahed type drones, the lowest monthly total since autumn 2025, averaging 143 per day, according to a report from the Institute for Science and International Security. Although overall volume has fallen from last summer’s peak, about two thirds were strike variants. This kept the average number of attack drones near 94 per day, meaning Moscow is launching fewer drones overall but a higher proportion intended to hit targets rather than merely exhaust air defences.
The Ukrainian energy company DTEK reported that its thermal power plants have been hit 11 times since October and more than 220 times since the full scale invasion began. Russia is also targeting energy workers. In the Donetsk region, a DTEK bucket truck used for aerial repairs to electricity lines was recently struck by a Russian drone, although the crew escaped. Less than two weeks earlier, two Shahed drones hit a bus carrying DTEK miners in Dnipropetrovsk region, killing 12.
It’s the hardest stretch of the war for Ukraine’s energy grid. Ukraine’s Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal said that in 2025 alone, Russia launched more than 600 targeted combined attacks on the country’s energy sector.
After first degrading generation capacity, Russia has shifted to repeatedly striking high voltage substations and transmission nodes, targeting the arteries of the grid rather than its power plants. Thermal generation that once stabilized winter demand is largely offline, transmission links are weakened, and replacement transformers can take years to procure.
Russia’s previous attempts using expensive missiles were not as effective. Russia’s main advantage now lies in the shifting economics of war. Cheap, mass-produced drones allow Moscow to strike the same facilities repeatedly, exhausting repair crews and critical components such as transformers faster than they can be replaced.
Ukraine has developed a growing fleet of drone interceptors, and has maintained an interception rate around 80%, although poor weather limits their effectiveness. A lag is also evident with operators requiring extended training, and systems must be integrated into layered air defences.
Meanwhile, Russia has increased the speed of its drones, effectively turning a Shahed drone into a cheap cruise missile hybrid, deployed waves of decoys, and flown them at varying altitudes and through cloud cover to complicate interception. Ukraine’s production of interceptors hasn’t kept up with Russia's production of drones.
Some drones can now relay data back to operators, mapping the location of Ukrainian air defences for follow-up strikes. Recent restrictions on Starlink usage may temporarily reduce the long-range effectiveness of certain Russian drone operations.
Although repeated attacks on energy infrastructure have placed significant strain on civilians, recent polling shows that 65% of Ukrainians say they are prepared to endure the war for as long as necessary. Ukraine’s leadership has shown little inclination to accept terms it considers unfavourable. Zelensky has indicated that he would rather accept no deal at all than impose a settlement his public views as unjust.
For Ukraine, a premature settlement risks inviting renewed aggression in the future. Russia’s ongoing bombing campaign against the civilian population reflects just how desperate the Kremlin is getting on the battlefield.
About the author
David Kirichenko
David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.
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