China, explained.
China’s approach to disarmament and non-proliferation has become increasingly complex and sometimes contradictory (Getty Images)
Beijing’s nuclear modernisation means its intentions and commitments to non-proliferation will continue to be questioned.
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US shifts nuclear focus to counter China’s growing arsenalUS shifts nuclear focus to counter China’s growing arsenal
The New York Times has reported that in March, US President Joe Biden approved a highly classified nuclear strategic plan for the United States. The paper goes on to say that for the first time, America’s deterrent strategy has reoriented to focus on China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal, as it also seeks to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from China, Russia and North Korea.
This shift in Washington’s policy comes after a Pentagon assessment that over the next decade China’s nuclear arsenal stockpiles will rival the size and diversity of those in the United States and Russia. In its Annual Report to Congress last year, the US Department of Defence highlighted two key aspects of China’s nuclear capabilities: First, that China has more than 500 active nuclear weapons, exceeding earlier estimates of 400 warheads, and following earlier assessments is expected to have a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 2035; and second, that in keeping with its modernisation objectives, China is expected to have more than 1,000 operable nuclear weapons by 2030, many of which will probably be “deployed at higher readiness levels”.
A White House spokesperson was careful to say the new plan was “not a response to any single entity, country, nor threat” and that the guidance provided, while secret, was in keeping with actions taken by earlier administrations.
Beijing, however, raised “grave concerns” over the reported plan, with China’s Foreign Ministry declaring “the US has called China a ‘nuclear threat’ and used it as a convenient pretext to shirk its obligation of nuclear disarmament, expand its own nuclear arsenal, and seek absolute strategic predominance.”
China has restated its “no first use” policy, saying it has “no intention to engage in any form of arms race with other countries”, while accusing the United States of being “the primary source of nuclear threats and strategic risks in the world”. Beijing said Washington would be better to make “drastic and substantive cuts to its nuclear arsenal”, and to stop “nuclear sharing” and other “negative moves that undermine global and regional peace and stability”.
As China’s economic and military power continues to grow, its approach to non-proliferation will likely shape the international security landscape for years to come.
Of the nine nuclear-armed powers, China has one of the fastest-growing nuclear arsenals at present. So, to state that China seeks to have parity with the United States or Russia cannot be blithely dismissed. Any increase in China’s nuclear stockpile raises serious concerns, given the opaque nature of the country’s nuclear capabilities and its modernisation ambitions. China’s intentions continue to be guided by Deng Xiaoping’s observations that nuclear force enhancements were necessary “to earn more say and a higher international status in a coming world order”. The Russia-Ukraine war has only reinforced this idea.
This modernisation also puts a spotlight on China’s commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation norms. China’s approach has become increasingly complex and sometimes contradictory. While stressing its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes disarmament obligations on the acknowledged nuclear powers, China has been expanding its nuclear arsenal and pursuing advanced nuclear technologies. China has also joined the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, however, is yet to ratify the agreement.
Less surprising is China’s opposition to the recently concluded Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. None of the nuclear-armed states have supported this treaty. China has consistently voted against a UN General Assembly resolution welcoming its adoption and last year justified its stance by straddling both sides of the issue, stating it “endorses the purposes of the TPNW and understands the wishes and the demands of non-nuclear-weapon states to advance nuclear disarmament” but that the nuclear disarmament process advocated by the TPNW “is divorced from the international security reality and goes against the principle of maintaining global strategic stability, undiminished security for all and step-by-step nuclear disarmament.”
However, China’s commitment to these goals has been questioned. It has been accused of transferring nuclear and missile technology to proliferators such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, leading the Biden administration to impose stricter export controls on nuclear materials and technology to China.
These developments underscore that as China’s economic and military power continues to grow, its approach to non-proliferation will likely shape the international security landscape for years to come. Beijing’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation will always be judged by its nuclear modernisation.
About the author
Amrita Jash
Dr Amrita Jash is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education (Institution of Eminence) in Manipal, India.
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