Japan, explained.
Japan's new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba speaks during a press conference in Tokyo, Japan on 1 October 2024 (Yuichi Yamazaki via Getty Images)
Shigeru Ishiba will have his hands full with domestic priorities but those same hands are safe on regional security questions.
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What Japan’s new Prime Minister thinks about Indo-Pacific peaceWhat Japan’s new Prime Minister thinks about Indo-Pacific peace
On 1 October, Shigeru Ishiba was sworn in as Japan’s new prime minister, after succeeding in his fifth attempt to win the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party.
He is familiar with Australia from his two posts as defence minister under Prime Minister Fukuda in 2007-08, and then agriculture minister in Prime Minister Aso’s cabinet in 2008-09, when the LDP was defeated in the general election by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). I was head of the Australian Embassy in Tokyo’s Political/Strategic Section during his tenure.
In both roles, Ishiba took forward Australia-Japan cooperation at a critical time. He was the defence minister responsible for implementing the 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the first of its kind for Japan with a country other than the United States, and took office just after the first Australia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministers 2+2 Talks, the first leaders’ level Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), and trilateral defence officials’ discussions. Now, the Australia-Japan special strategic partnership includes the landmark Reciprocal Access Agreement that allows each country’s forces to operate in the other country.
As agriculture minister, too, Ishiba actively promoted deepening of the economic relationship, including negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. He believed that this was strategically important for likeminded partners, and that any sensitivities, such as agriculture, could be worked through. The Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2014.
Ishiba strongly supports the Japan-US alliance, but he has argued that this needs to evolve with the times to become an alliance “between equals”.
An experienced politician of over 38 years, Ishiba is a safe pair of hands. But his term comes at a challenging time for the LDP, which has been in power almost continuously since its establishment in 1955. In the face of a series of political funding and other scandals which have rocked the party, Ishiba will need to restore public trust and win back support before the lower house election on 27 October, as well as maintain the LDP’s majority in the upper house election mid-next year. He also needs to reinvigorate Japan’s slowing economy, make its social security system more sustainable, and address energy and economic security challenges.
He has already attracted criticism for his cabinet appointments, which do not appear to prioritise party unity, are heavily weighted to defence expertise, and include only two women, despite his previous comments on the importance of women’s participation in decision-making and stated commitment to promoting women’s opportunities. He has also been accused of prioritising party interests in calling an election so soon, after earlier insisting that elections should be held after the parliamentary session, allowing voters to have sufficient information on which to base their decision.
Ishiba's cabinet appointments have attracted criticism for being heavily weighted to defence expertise and include only two women (Kyodo News via Getty Images)
But it is Ishiba’s likely defence and security policies that have attracted most attention. A defence expert, Ishiba has long held the view that collective security structures are critical for Indo-Pacific stability and peace, and that this also requires a stronger, more equal Japan.
He supported the cabinet’s decision under the late Shinzo Abe to reinterpret the constitution to allow the exercise of the right of collective defence, and the Fumio Kishida administration’s increase of Japan’s defence budget to 2% of GDP. Ishiba believes that these commitments should be reflected in new, comprehensive national security legislation. He also supports further constitutional reform.
These are difficult issues for a society that has still not fully come to terms with its past and is cautious about constitutional revision.
Ishiba strongly supports the Japan-US alliance, but he has argued that this needs to evolve with the times to become an alliance “between equals” – such as allowing Japan’s forces to be stationed in Guam and greater joint management of US bases in Japan. He believes strengthening Japan’s capacity to defend itself, “by itself”, would benefit both partners, boost deterrence, and allow Japan to make an even stronger contribution to international peace and security.
His policy expertise and goodwill towards Australia provide opportunities for an even stronger bilateral relationship.
Ishiba has long been a proponent of collective self-defence. In a recent paper for the Hudson Institute, he said Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, the Russia-China “no limits” partnership, and cooperation enabling North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, all clearly demonstrated why the region needed stronger collective security approaches. Ishiba proposed greater integration of bilateral, trilateral and minilateral strategic partnerships such as the Quad, AUKUS, and the Japan-US-ROK and Japan-US-Philippines frameworks. This could, in future, develop into a “NATO-like” network of alliances that would promote regional security by deterring potential aggressors. Such a network could be complemented by confidence-building measures such as joint exercises on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, further reducing threats.
When I met Ishiba at the Diet building during a visit to Japan in June, we discussed current challenges to the rules-based order and regional members’ concerns about developments that threatened regional security and peace – from disinformation campaigns, economic coercion and influence operations, to unsafe actions in international waters and airspace, and large-scale military operations that risked accidents and escalation. As close partners, Australia and Japan had a key role to play in working with others to address these challenges and maintain regional stability.
In August, visiting Taiwan as head of a parliamentary delegation, Ishiba told Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te that ensuring “today’s Ukraine [did] not become tomorrow’s East Asia”, was the region’s most pressing need. In September, a Japanese guided-missile destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait for the first time, accompanied by Australian and New Zealand ships, asserting the right of freedom of navigation in these international waters.
Ishiba believes in a stronger and more engaged Japan, and in close likeminded partnerships to promote regional security. This is in Australia’s interests, and in the interests of the region. Whether the Japanese political system, and public, are ready for the kind of overhaul of Japan’s security policies that Ishiba espouses is far from clear, and he will have his hands full with domestic priorities. But his policy expertise and goodwill towards Australia provide opportunities for an even stronger bilateral relationship, better able to promote Indo-Pacific stability, prosperity and peace.
About the author
Jenny Bloomfield
Jenny Bloomfield was a career officer with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for 29 years, and was most recently Australia’s Representative at the Australian Office in Taiwan. Her memoir, Australian Ambassador, will be published in August. jennybloomfield.com.au
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