In recent months, anti-China protests have flooded South Korea’s public spaces. Far-right marches denouncing supposed Chinese Communist Party infiltration and Chinese immigration are regular fixtures in districts known to attract Chinese migrants. During elections, activists have conducted improvised Korean language tests and ID checks on voters in front of polling stations to unmask Chinese infiltrators. Banners warning of Chinese tourists taking over the country have sprung up at road intersections. And in Seoul, a café has announced a “no Chinese customers” policy.
Burgeoning military power fuels Beijing’s ambitions to expand its territory and influence in ways unfavourable to Seoul.
A survey conducted earlier this year shows most South Koreans harbour a negative view of China, and that this dislike is growing. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that the country’s giant neighbour is a considerable political and military threat. In the past three decades, Beijing has conducted one of the greatest military buildups in history. With the aim of asserting its power in the region and “reunifying” with Taiwan, it is ceaselessly constructing new warships and expanding its nuclear arsenal. China now has a clear military lead over any of its neighbours, prompting growing fears that it could defeat the United States in an East Asian contingency.
This burgeoning military power fuels Beijing’s ambitions to expand its territory and influence in ways unfavourable to Seoul. China and South Korea contest the delimitation of the West Sea’s continental shelf, with Beijing claiming the Gageo Reef and Ieodo Islet for itself. China has installed floating structures in the Provisional Measures Zone that violate pre-existing bilateral agreements. The occasional suggestion that Beijing is entitled to historical special rights over the Korean Peninsula, as well as media and popular attempts within China to rebrand South Korean cultural elements as Chinese and belittle Korea’s achievements, do not help to create sympathy.
But xenophobia against everyday Chinese citizens living in South Korea leads to nothing good and helps little to curb Beijing’s power and hegemonic ambitions. Worse, it could harm South Korea in several ways. First, it could disincentivise those of Chinese descent from visiting the country, thereby damaging the tourism industry. Second, in an era of accelerated demographic collapse, Seoul cannot afford to scare away foreign workers. Third, it may damage South Korea’s global image as a welcoming nation safe for travel and investment, leading to lost opportunities at a time when its economic prospects are already gloomy.
Instead, the better route for South Koreans to channel their legitimate concerns would be through the array of policy options available to combat the Chinese threat. For example, tighter screening of incoming Chinese students and strategic-sector workers could reduce the number of individuals linked to the Chinese military and intelligence services seeking to spy on South Korea’s defences and gain access to South Korean research centres and tech companies.
On its own, South Korea has little capacity to deter Chinese aggression.
Economic resilience could also be bolstered. Around a quarter of South Korea’s exports go to China, creating a dangerous economic vulnerability that Beijing could use to harm the country. Reducing this trade weakness, alongside the dependency on Chinese rare earths, is thus urgent.
On its own, South Korea has little capacity to deter Chinese aggression. Reinforcing and modernising the US alliance is key, but not sufficient. Seoul should continue to increase defence and economic cooperation and policy coordination with like-minded states such as Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India to collectively deter and contain Chinese power.
The recent agreement with the United States that secured Seoul’s rights to nuclear-propelled submarines is a first step to denting China’s military dominance. Still, it is far from enough, and South Korea has no hope of counterbalancing Chinese power with conventional means alone. Against that background, pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent could be the best option to blunt Beijing’s quest for territorial aggrandisement and regional hegemony and to guarantee South Korea’s long-term foreign policy freedom.
Finally, relations with North Korea are part of the larger regional picture. The poorer the inter-Korean relations, the more leverage China has over the two halves of the Peninsula. Hence, engaging with North Korea is essential to decreasing Pyongyang’s diplomatic and economic reliance on Beijing, thereby reducing its sway over the two countries.
Numerous viable policies exist to push back against Beijing and secure Seoul’s interests. Discriminating against Chinese individuals in South Korea is not one of them.
