Australia, explained.
Voting during the general elections in Honiara, Solomon Islands, 17 April 2024 (Saeed Khan/AFP via Getty Images)
Pacific governments will ultimately judge Australia on concrete actions rather than friendly gestures.
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After listening, what’s Australia’s next move in the Pacific?After listening, what’s Australia’s next move in the Pacific?
Anthony Albanese’s Labor government first took office in May 2022, after an election campaign in which Foreign Minister Penny Wong lamented her predecessors had overseen Australia’s “worst foreign policy blunder in the Pacific … since the end of World War II”: a secret security pact between China and Solomon Islands. That deal granted China military access just 2,000 kilometres northeast of Australia, dramatically shifting the regional balance of power.
The shock spurred Canberra into diplomatic overdrive. Labor promised a fresh approach, embarking on what it billed as a Pacific “listening tour”. This was warmly welcomed in the region, seen as a break from past Australian attitudes perceived as neglectful or patronising.
With Albanese re-elected, the question arises: after all this listening, what next?
Certainly, Labor’s attentive diplomacy has borne fruit. Deals with Tuvalu, Nauru and Papua New Guinea will bring closer bilateral security integration. Successes in regional banking and policing demonstrate that Australia can be nuanced, responsive and expansive in its offerings to the Pacific.
Pacific countries might be forgiven for thinking Australia is paying off like a broken pokie machine.
Yet goodwill has its limits. Solomon Islands remains wary, deeply dependent on China for trade, and somewhat vulnerable to political interference. Vanuatu, equally cautious, appears reluctant to align closely with Australia, preferring to exploit its growing leverage amid big-power rivalry.
The Pacific’s stance has shifted noticeably. Pragmatic non-alignment has given way to transactional diplomacy, with Pacific leaders openly leveraging their strategic positions. Australia has responded generously, agreeing to long-requested measures, from climate mobility with Tuvalu and bolstering Nauru’s banking sector, to expanded labour mobility schemes and enhanced budget support. Even funding a PNG NRL team. Pacific countries might be forgiven for thinking Australia is paying off like a broken pokie machine.
Yet Canberra’s spending spree is under scrutiny at home. With domestic pressures mounting – on housing, healthcare, cost-of-living and defence – can Australia sustain its Pacific generosity?
Australia has little choice.
Despite the increasing “costs” of Australia’s Pacific diplomacy, closer economic and security integration remains the most effective way to meet regional security threats, ensure stability, and to secure Australian access and influence. And there are several big-ticket items in play – all in their early stages, and almost all vulnerable to derailment by outside interests or dissenting views within the Pacific.
Canberra’s proposed banking guarantee to maintain Australian banking services in the Pacific is a promising start to closer economic integration, facilitating vital financial flows and supporting economic stability across the region. This initiative, once legislated, can help attract a wider array of international business interest in addressing urgent infrastructure gaps in the Pacific, from renewable energy to digital connectivity.
On the security front, Canberra has championed the Pacific Policing Initiative (focused on regional law enforcement cooperation) and the Pacific Response Group (focused on defence humanitarian deployments).
Meanwhile, the Pacific Islands Forum is due to present an update on Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s “Ocean of Peace” concept at the next Leaders’ Meeting in Solomon Islands in September this year. This could be a significant step forward for the Forum in asserting a clear, regional rules-based security order, beyond the Biketawa and Boe Declarations. Or it could be more of the same. That’s up to Pacific leaders.
Pacific countries face daunting security threats, from illegal fishing and transnational crime to cyber threats and natural disasters. Better aligned and more effective regional responses to security challenges require robust intelligence cooperation. While intelligence cooperation, or intelligence diplomacy, is already a feature of Australia’s and New Zealand’s security relationships with Pacific countries, this is done on a case-by-case basis, and is not always effective.
Perhaps it is time to formalise a Pacific intelligence-sharing arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, PNG, Fiji and other willing Pacific countries. A sustained working-level arrangement could provide timely warnings and coordinated responses to shared threats, boosting regional trust and effectiveness. This would complement the existing Pacific Fusion Centre, where regional analysts can be seconded and undertake training but which provides broad-based assessments rather than facilitating deep operational intelligence exchanges.
PNG and Fiji have made fast progress reforming and modernising their national security architecture. Aside from being among the more strategically aligned Pacific countries (apart from the Freely Associated States, which have intimate security relationships with the United States), they also have growing capabilities to be regional security providers.
Openly acknowledging such intelligence cooperation between Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific countries would be a vivid demonstration of reciprocal trust and genuine security partnerships.
Despite Canberra’s claims of being part of a “Pacific Family”, its Kafkaesque visa regime remains deeply unpopular in the region. Freer movement of Pacific peoples would substantiate Australia’s claims of “familial” ties and improve trust. Many in Canberra are squeamish about perceptions of special treatment — but isn’t that precisely the point?
If Australian concerns centre on document integrity and border security, helping Pacific countries improve identity verification systems would simultaneously enhance regional security cooperation and streamline travel processes. Australia might then have a better chance of attaining that holy grail of regional integration: stronger people-to-people links.
Yet Australia’s sluggish visa system continues to frustrate Pacific governments and ordinary citizens alike, be they businesspeople, students or those trying to visit their loved ones. This isn’t about immigration, it’s about temporary visitor access. Current settings pose a barrier tougher even than sparse geography or limited transport links. A rethink here is overdue.
All these moves require careful diplomacy. While Labor’s initial listening campaign was commendable, Pacific governments will ultimately judge Australia on concrete actions rather than friendly gestures.
Pitfalls remain, particularly around sensitivities to perceived paternalism. Vanuatu and Solomon Islands illustrate how quickly ties can deteriorate. Pacific leaders remain wary of the destabilising effects of geopolitical rivalry, even as they seek to leverage competition for greater benefits.
The Albanese government, having corrected past neglect, now faces a delicate balancing act. In a region increasingly defined by transactional diplomacy, to convert goodwill into lasting regional influence, it must blend tangible economic and security integration with genuine reciprocity.
About the author
Mihai Sora
Mihai Sora is Director of Research at the Lowy Institute, where he leads the Institute’s research agenda across programs spanning geopolitics and security, the Indo-Pacific, China, the United States, global economics, aid and development, and the international order.
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