China, explained.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump attend a welcoming ceremony in Beijing in 2017 during Trump’s first term in office (Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images)
Despite a focus on domestic imperatives, neither leader has lost sight of the higher goal of becoming numero uno.
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A grand bargain between Trump and Xi?A grand bargain between Trump and Xi?
Asked about potential cooperation with China, Donald Trump declared: “China and the United States can together solve all of the problems of the world, if you think about it.” He wants Xi Jinping to visit the United States soon.
Trump’s attempt to reach out to China flows from his domestic political proclivity. Contrary to conventional analysis, “Make America Great Again” is a very old and recurring theme of US politics. Apart from fostering Hamiltonian and McKinleyish tendencies for tariffs, Trump borrows heavily from the Jacksonian current of the American Old West. A portrait of “Old Hickory” even adorned the Oval Office during Trump’s first round in Washington. Jacksonians are deeply suspicious of established elites, emphasise a folk community with a common American destiny, and believe in the right to bear arms as core tenets of being American. Lavish consumerism and financial vivacity are also essential ingredients. Talk of the Trump bling? Jacksonians have always loved it.
Jacksonians also think that the government exists to serve the economic interests of the American “middle class”. Protectionism is prized. War and peace, for Jacksonians, are not questions of morality. The de-facto intention is isolationist but when a clear threat manifests, an all-out blowout is what Jacksonians demand. If tangible national interests are on the line, “hit them hard” is the reigning sentiment. But first, ask yourself, is there any existential threat to the United States right now?
For Trump, the economic rebuilding of the United States is the main priority (irrespective of the current state of the US economy). All other issues are either subservient to the economy or trivial distractions. Trump’s desire for an immediate ceasefire in Europe does not stem solely from his admiration for President Vladimir Putin. Trump seeks a ceasefire because support for Ukraine amounts to – in his reasoning – throwing American money across the shores without good reason. To Trump, Ukraine is an expensive diversion. For now, he also does not see an unambiguous threat to American national security. The tussle with China might involve American prestige, but it is not existential. It needs fierce mercantile management, not hard containment, thinks Trump.
The tussle with China might involve American prestige, but it is not existential.
This is why Trump’s cajolery of President Xi is significant. Regional players in the Indo-Pacific, such as India, Japan and Australia, intuitively understand this dynamic and therefore remain anxious about any G2-style arrangement between Trump and Xi. The United States might want to compete with China in the long run, but aren’t we all dead in the long run?
Take India, for example. In recent weeks, both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar have sought to woo Trump with fawning flattery. Delhi’s blandishments for Trump are born out of the unsaid anxiety that the new administration might dilute its focus from the Indo-Pacific. If competition with China was the Trump administration’s unambiguous priority, Delhi would have felt secure about India’s role in US foreign policy. Reliance on excessive personal chemistry with Trump would be unnecessary. Healthy relations between heads of state are a soothing balm, not a substitute for structural alignment.
From Beijing’s standpoint, a modus vivendi with Trump in Asia leaves it relatively free to focus on internal challenges of the economy, demography, energy transition, technological development and getting its pesky neighbours to kowtow. But make no mistake, a G2 arrangement with Trump in Asia is not the peak of the Chinese ruling party’s ambitions. Beijing’s quest to push the Americans out of Asia remains robust. Even Chiang Kai-shek, the pre-1949 leader of China – once close to the United States – wrote “avenge humiliation” in his every diary entry for twenty straight years. He was referring to what modern Chinese leaders call the “century of humiliation”.
Historically, China has cooperated with the West when it suits its interests, while keeping intact the higher goal of becoming numero uno.
For regional players in the Indo-Pacific, a grand bargain between Trump and Xi may complicate matters. As the Singaporeans say: when two elephants rumble, the grass below gets trampled. But when elephants make love, the grass below still gets trampled.
About the author
Ved Shinde
Ved Shinde is an incoming doctoral candidate at the University of Cambridge. He has previously been associated the Asia Society Policy Institute and the American Enterprise Institute.
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