Southeast Asia, explained.
A President Kamala Harris would likely maintain the Biden administration’s broad suite of Asia policies (Willy Kurniawan/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
Many Southeast Asian countries already see the United States as a more distant and less reliable partner.
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Kamala Harris and the Indo-Pacific: Correcting the attention deficitKamala Harris and the Indo-Pacific: Correcting the attention deficit
This article also appears in a collection of essays, Harris v Trump, written by Lowy Institute experts on the implications for Australia of the US presidential election.
The Biden administration sees its Asia policy as an overlooked success story — attracting much less attention than Ukraine or the Middle East, but noteworthy for the administration’s shoring up of alliances and partnerships.
It’s likely, then, that a President Kamala Harris would maintain the Biden administration’s broad suite of Asia policies, especially the deepening of alliances with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and the networking of these partnerships via the Quad, AUKUS, the “Squad” (including the Philippines, Japan, and Australia), and various trilateral groupings, including with Japan and South Korea.
However, several pitfalls could prevent Harris from living up to the Biden administration’s Asia track record.
The first is personnel, starting from the top. Harris has engaged regularly with Asian leaders and travelled to Asia five times, including to Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Harris has met President Ferdinand Marcos Jr of the Philippines six times, more meetings than with any other world leader, and has travelled to the Philippines, including Palawan, close to disputed features in the South China Sea. While Harris has sought to portray this as reflecting prioritisation of the region, many see vice-presidential travel as reflecting the reverse: a delegation of less important priorities (such as attending the 2023 ASEAN summit in Jakarta) to the president’s deputy. And while Harris’ engagements in the region seem to have been positive, she represented administration policy, rather than articulating a distinctive vision. So it is difficult to discern Harris’ true level of interest in, or focus on, the region.
Whether Harris can retain key personnel such as Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, central to Biden’s Asia strategy, will also be of high importance. She has appointed US Ambassador to ASEAN Yohannes Abraham to her presidential transition team. Abraham brings fresh regional experience but his appointment, which has already pulled him back from Jakarta, also signals that the ambassadorship to ASEAN is far from a vital position for the United States (it was largely vacant over a five-year period until Abraham took it up in 2022).
The expertise and focus of a Harris administration would matter, because it would face some real challenges in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia.
A second (and perennial) challenge for US policy in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, is the question of resourcing and focus. Harris’ Democratic National Convention speech was illuminating in this respect, containing only glancing mentions of Asia and China, with other more politically salient foreign policy challenges such as Ukraine and the Middle East receiving more detailed treatment. It remains an open question whether Harris and her running mate, Tim Walz, will be able to sustain a focus on Asia, including through practical steps such as appointing ambassadors to key positions, travelling to relevant summits, and staffing a much higher tempo of bureaucratic engagements with Asia, which the Biden administration has established.
The expertise and focus of a Harris administration would matter, because it would face some real challenges in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. These include managing the spillover effects of a more confrontational approach to China on a region that largely prefers to hedge between the superpowers rather than take sides, providing a compelling economic offering despite rising protectionism in the United States, and managing a divergence with the region on the questions of democracy and liberal values.
Harris’ more progressive politics means many analysts have questioned whether democracy promotion will become a pitfall in her engagement with less democratic countries in Southeast and South Asia, including India. If Harris seeks to replicate the Biden team’s success in Asia, she is unlikely to let values stand in the way of closer pragmatic partnerships with countries such as India and Vietnam. Even so, excessive rhetorical emphasis from Harris or Walz on democracy and liberal values could keep some relationships in the region lukewarm. Harris’ slightly more critical approach to Israel could help US standing in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, where the Biden administration’s strong backing of Israel’s war on Hamas has adversely impacted perceptions of the United States.
While US allies would enthusiastically welcome the prospect of continuity from the Biden administration, most Southeast Asian countries will be more ambivalent about a Harris presidency. Many already see the United States as a more distant and less reliable partner that will come and go according to its domestic and global priorities. They will wait and see where Southeast Asia fits in the hierarchy of US priorities.
About the author
Susannah Patton
Susannah Patton is Director, Asia Engagement at RMIT and a Nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
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