Australia, explained.
Even if a Democratic president is elected in 2028, Australia cannot assume a return to the pre-Trump era (Getty Images Plus)
Political inertia threatens Australia’s ability to adapt to a changing relationship.
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The new transactional era: Australia’s US alliance needs reviewThe new transactional era: Australia’s US alliance needs review
Less than two months into Trump’s second coming, Australia’s worst fears for an empowered MAGA presidency are materialising quickly: the undermining of alliances, the imposition of blanket tariffs, the abandonment of Ukraine and the embrace of Russia, the degrading of liberal democracies.
In response, there have been cascading calls for a major rethink of Australia’s alliance with the United States, including contingencies should Trump rebuke AUKUS.
Former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has called for a review of “every aspect of our alliance with the Americans,” arguing that “[w]hile we can always hope that the United States and other allies will come to our aid, we cannot assume they will”.
Similarly, former senior official Richard Maude has written that: “Four long years of Trump, and the aftershocks that will follow, will require Australia to rethink or re-gear elements of its foreign and defence policy and make more determined investments in national resilience.”
Incentives are stacked against the kind of first principles review of the alliance that Australia needs.
Such calls should be heeded – and quickly. This does not mean abandoning the US alliance, but it does mean interrogating how much reliance and cooperation Australia can realistically expect from America.
What should such a review look like? A small but well-resourced taskforce, led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence, with a prime ministerial mandate, should be convened examining every dimension of the bilateral relationship. Even if a Democratic president is elected in 2028, Australia cannot assume a return to the pre-Trump era. As Maude argues, “the mood in America that Trump both exploits and represents, albeit in an extreme form, is here to stay”.
For such a review to be effective, it must challenge Australia’s fundamental foreign policy assumptions. But this is where the roadblock lies. At both the political and bureaucratic level, incentives are stacked against the kind of first principles review of the alliance that Australia needs. An imminent federal election only complicates matters.
USS Ashville in Perth, Western Australia (Craig Walton/Defence Department)
Ideally, the initiative for such a review should come from elected leaders. However, there is good reason to be sceptical this will come. With the impending caretaker period, the current government is not well placed to undertake new policy initiatives. This pushes any serious thinking back to after the election. But even then, neither side has demonstrated an appetite for a major rethink.
The Coalition – leading in recent polls – has been a paragon of alliance orthodoxy. Opposition leader Peter Dutton has staked his foreign policy credentials on being a Trump whisperer. He was also defence minister when AUKUS was created and is unlikely to seek alternatives to one of his major achievements.
Labor, if re-elected, would face a dilemma. While Albanese and his ministers have criticised Trump on individual policy decisions such as Ukraine, Gaza and tariffs, they have always reaffirmed the enduring centrality of the alliance. This is partly about reassuring Washington, but also about deflecting criticisms from the Coalition that Labor is appeasing the left.
A re-elected Albanese government would be hyper-sensitive to being wedged on the alliance by an ascendant opposition. With minority government (supported by Greens and Teal MPs) being its most feasible path to retaining power, Labor would be especially cautious about a major review of the alliance, determined to avoid the impression it was compromising on foreign policy with the crossbench.
It will take courage for senior officials to give advice that is either unwanted or politically inconvenient.
There are two, albeit improbable, scenarios where the political impetus for a review could emerge. The first is a returned majority Labor government with enough political capital to wear the predictable criticisms. The second is a permanent shift in public sentiment that sees Trump’s personal unpopularity in Australia translate into a permanent aversion to allying closely with the United States.
If the political class will not drive a rethink of the alliance, then Australia might have to rely on a bottom-up approach led by the bureaucracy. But there is little to suggest that DFAT, Defence and other key agencies have the scope and licence to stick their necks out to challenge foreign policy orthodoxies without being pushed by their political masters.
So far, the bureaucracy has adopted a reactive “wait and see” approach to Trump 2.0, with departments urged not to overreact to the president’s words or pre-empt his actions. While this might be tactically sound, it is no substitute for long-term strategy. DFAT’s anaemic “Australia in the World 2025 Snapshot” is symptomatic of the bureaucratic inertia. Describing the United States, it simply says: “President Trump's America First agenda envisages a different role for the United States in the world.” A profound insight, indeed.
The bureaucracy does, however, have a valuable opportunity as it prepares incoming government briefs for both major parties ahead of the election. These documents are just as much about forging relationships with ministers as they are substantive policy advice. So, it will take courage for senior officials to give advice that is either unwanted or politically inconvenient. But the chance to make the case for a major review to a newly (re)elected government is too important to waste.
It is far from inevitable that the US alliance will break in some fundamental or irreparable way. It is, however, certain to become more contingent and transactional. Regardless, Australia must not wait for a point of no return – when its options have narrowed, and anxiety clouds its judgement – to invest in the deep thinking and contingency planning that a Trumpian world demands.
About the author
Hugh Piper
Hugh Piper is a director at Ancrum Advisory.
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