A row with Lee Jae Myung ensured after Volodymyr Zelenskyy disclosed a deal to send North Korean POWs to South Korea (Loey Felipe/UN Photo, Cheong Wa Dae/KoreaNet)

South Korea’s dispute with Kyiv is about more than two POWs

The row over two prisoners exposes Seoul’s reluctance to arm Ukraine, provoke Pyongyang, or risk its Russia trade.

Nika Pasko

14 October 20264 min read

Before Donald Trump’s deal to buy diesel from Vladimir Putin snatched the headlines, another dispute between leaders had added to the shadows over Ukraine.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disclosure (Opens in new window) at the United Nations last month that North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) had been transferred to South Korea drew criticism from Lee Jae-myung. Although the public knew negotiations over the transfer had been ongoing since summer 2026, the South Korean President wanted to keep the transfer low-key and confidential. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was initially cautious (Opens in new window), neither denying nor confirming Zelenskyy’s words, but later claimed the two states had reached a “clear understanding” that the transfer should not be announced publicly.

The conflict escalated after Lee’s 24 September social media post (Opens in new window) accusing Ukraine of breaching the agreement to keep the repatriation secret. The Blue House then issued a demand (Opens in new window) for an official apology from Ukraine on 27 September. The National Intelligence Service said (Opens in new window) Ukraine initially asked for confidentiality. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called (Opens in new window) it a “diplomatic misunderstanding” and said that South Korea is an “important country” for Kyiv.

Lee warned (Opens in new window) that South Korea might “take further measures” if it does not issue a public apology, adding that Ukraine’s denial of an agreement to keep the transfer secret was tantamount to calling Lee a liar. On 6 October, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Cho Hyun announced (Opens in new window) that Ukraine had apologised, but not to the extent expected. South Korea would continue to consider measures, including the possibility of recalling its ambassador from Kyiv.

Trump’s interest in reviving diplomacy with North Korea may explain why Lee escalated Zelenskyy’s remark into a diplomatic conflict rather than resolving the issue quietly.

While South Korea’s response may seem like an overreaction, the broader context of the Lee administration’s policy helps explain why it was so sensitive to Zelenskyy’s announcement.

Since the beginning of his term, Lee has advocated for better relations with Pyongyang, and making the transfer of POWs public could be perceived as a demonstration of ideological victory over North Korea. Just the day before Zelenskyy’s speech, Lee expressed (Opens in new window) his support for North Korea–US dialogue and pledged that South Korea would “exert every effort” to facilitate it. Meeting with Lee on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Trump reaffirmed (Opens in new window) his wish to resume talks with Kim Jong-un and cited his good relationship with the North Korean leader. Trump’s interest in reviving diplomacy with North Korea may explain why Lee escalated Zelenskyy’s remark into a diplomatic conflict rather than resolving the issue quietly. Notably, the US has not officially commented on this matter.

Ukraine has been urging South Korea to deliver lethal weapons and air defence systems, which goes against Seoul’s policy of not providing arms to countries engaged in active military conflict. South Korea has repeatedly expressed that it has no plans to send weapons to Ukraine. While Lee pledged (Opens in new window) $100 million in aid at the NATO summit in July, he reaffirmed that South Korea’s refusal to transfer lethal weapons “remains unchanged”. South Koreans do not support delivering arms to Ukraine: in 2024, 82% (Opens in new window) opposed it. The recent diplomatic dispute may indirectly signal to Kyiv that Seoul’s patience has limits, even if the public may not support this bold move. This month, polls (Opens in new window) show that nearly 60% of South Koreans favoured a cautious response, while 35% supported suspending aid to Ukraine.

South Korea’s relations with Russia are another factor to consider. For supporting US sanctions against Moscow, South Korea was added to the Kremlin’s list of “unfriendly countries”. In 2024, Putin also warned (Opens in new window) Seoul not to provide weapons to Kyiv, saying Moscow would otherwise take measures “which are unlikely to please the current leadership of South Korea”. The Kremlin has so far kept quiet on the transfer of the North Korean POWs, avoiding escalation in its relations with Seoul. Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said (Opens in new window) he had no information about the transfer of POWs to South Korea and declined to comment on possible contacts between Russia, Ukraine, and North Korea on the matter.

South Korea’s position between Russia and Ukraine grew even more complicated after the recent discovery that more than 176,000 tonnes (Opens in new window) of fuel had been shipped to Vladivostok in summer. Some of the tankers were under UK and EU sanctions. In August, South Korea became Russia’s second-largest fuel exporter, supplying 31% (Opens in new window) of its fuel imports. This was happening as Ukraine attacked Russian oil refineries, causing an acute fuel shortage across the country. Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk said (Opens in new window) South Korean fuel shipments helped Russia offset problems caused by its reduced refining capacity.

Although the fuel exports and disclosure of the POW transfer created friction between South Korea and Ukraine and led Western countries to question Seoul’s commitment to sanctions, the incident is unlikely to have lasting consequences. Jeopardising ties with Ukraine would damage Seoul’s standing among its allies, so the row is likely to fade. As for inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s leadership has been ignoring Lee’s calls to resume dialogue.

About the author

Nika Pasko

Nika Pasko is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University.

Topics

South Korea Ukraine Russia North Korea