Stabilising ties with China is not appeasement

In 2019, the Morrison government sent me to Beijing as the Australian ambassador. Having dealt with China for much of my career in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, I thought I knew what to expect. But I was wrong.

For the next three years, Australia–China ties were essentially frozen. Our exports were disrupted, ministers could not meet, rhetoric was hostile. Zero-Covid restrictions added to the isolation.

This impasse became counterproductive for Australia. We needed a circuit-breaker. That turned out to be the change of government in May 2022. Both sides were able to pause the cycle of negativity and start talking.

Under the heading of “stabilisation”, Australia again has a functioning relationship and normal trade flows.

Hardline commentators often criticise this approach as being weak and appeasing. But I see it as a sensible way to manage what we have at stake with China, both positive and negative.

A functioning relationship is not an end in itself. It is a necessary mechanism for advancing important objectives. Some are largely positive: political contact, trade, movement of people, and law enforcement. Others are defensive: our sovereignty, domestic and regional security, and resilience.

The Australian government needs a framework within which to pursue all of these objectives jointly and coherently. The stabilisation policy has enabled us to do so, while maintaining and strengthening the protections introduced over the past decade.

More strident protests will not help with our defensive interests, nor deter bad behaviour. But if they get us into a position where we cannot pursue our positive interests, this becomes a counterproductive dead end. Would the critics really prefer we went back to 2020–22?

Rather than rhetoric, what is more important is to be clear-eyed about our interests and bottom lines and firm in sticking to them. A touch of dexterity in implementation is also helpful – that’s what they call diplomacy.

Stabilising bilateral ties never promised to stop Beijing being destabilising. As Foreign Minister Wong acknowledged in 2023 (Opens in new window), “we start with the reality that China is going to keep being China”. Canberra is realistic about the risks of China’s growing power, ambitions and activities, both to Australia and the region. But it is also realistic about viable responses. This accounts for its additional domestic measures and efforts with allies and neighbours.

For its part, China still hopes to draw Australia more into its orbit. It has offered to move beyond stabilisation and do more in areas such as infrastructure, the green economy and AI.

I cannot imagine enthusiasm at our end for such things. We want to contain and reduce vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and supply chains, not add to them. Where the relationship now sits is probably good enough for Canberra. Going further involves more risk, not least for perceptions domestically and with international partners.

The pathway ahead is unlikely to be smooth. Australia–China ties remain liable to disruption. Most of the earlier disagreements are still lurking and could flare up again, including on Taiwan, restrictions on investment and technology, the Port of Darwin, instability in the Pacific Islands, or rare earths supply chains. The international context could also pull or push in unexpected directions, with Canberra caught between conflicting demands as US–China rivalry intensifies.

Australia will never become as genuinely close to China as it is to Japan or other like-minded partners. The gulf between our worldviews and national security agendas is too wide.

Nonetheless, self-interest has built the relationship that we now have. It will continue to support a pragmatic approach that takes account of all our interests and delivers results.

It is now a year since I left the public service. Compared to 2019, the character of this relationship has certainly changed. Both sides have learned some lessons. These should enable better handling of future disagreements. If so, stabilisation will have been worthwhile.

Graham Fletcher is author of the Lowy Institute Analysis paper, Australia and China: Embracing while sparring (Opens in new window).