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An unmanned ground vehicle loaded with supplies moves through the streets of Kostyantynivka, Ukraine (Kostiantyn Liberov/Libkos/Getty Images)
The drone war has moved to the ground, and the results are already reshaping frontline tactics.
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In Ukraine, ground robots are increasingly going on the offensiveIn Ukraine, ground robots are increasingly going on the offensive
Throughout the war, Ukraine has relied on technology to offset Russia’s greater numbers in personnel and materiel. Aerial drones became the backbone of that effort, helping blunt assaults, guide artillery and strike deep behind the front. Now the same logic is moving onto the ground.
As the kill zone expands, Kyiv is increasingly turning to unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to carry supplies, evacuate the wounded, and, in some cases, go on the offensive. This shift is being driven by necessity. Ukraine now has 280 companies developing UGVs.
On large stretches of the front, the most dangerous task is simply getting in and out. Ukrainian UGVs now regularly destroy Russian drones waiting in ambush along these routes, helping protect human vehicle drivers and wounded soldiers, also being evacuated by UGVs.
One machine-gun-equipped UGV reportedly held a position for about 45 days.
The 3rd Assault Brigade reportedly transported more than 200 tonnes of goods in one month alone using UGVs, the equivalent of 10,000 soldiers each carrying 20 kilograms to frontline positions. Colonel Anatolii Kulykivskyi has said that ground drones now handle 70% of the brigade’s frontline logistics. One Ukrainian soldier added that, in a single month, his unit used one Termit UGV for 18 sorties, spending a total of 88.5 hours on the move to provide logistical support to frontline positions. Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has said Ukrainian forces carried out more than 7,000 UGV missions in a single month.
Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi, commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps, has argued that units that actively integrate UGVs could reduce frontline infantry requirements by up to 30% by the end of 2026, which could reach up to 80% in the future.
One machine-gun-equipped UGV reportedly held a position for about 45 days. In January, the 3rd Assault Brigade released footage showing a kamikaze UGV loaded with 12 TM-62 anti-tank mines attacking Russian troops sheltering in a building.
In January, three Russian soldiers surrendered to a Ukrainian UGV near Lyman, likely the first recorded case in warfare of troops surrendering to a remotely piloted ground vehicle. Fedorov has said that during the winter alone, more than 100 Russian troops laid down their arms thanks to Ukrainian unmanned systems.
Going on the offensive, turreted UGVs are able to roll to a Russian dugout, open fire, destroy the position and then withdraw. In November, a machine-gun-equipped robotic platform also engaged a Russian MT-LB at close range. Ukrainian company DevDroid has added an AI-assisted target detection and identification system to its ground robots, using multiple cameras, including thermal imaging, to help operators detect enemy personnel and movement at longer range. Ukrainian defence-tech firms Frontline Robotics and BUREVII have also unveiled a new UGV system that combines a robotic turret armed with an Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher with the ARDAL mobile ground platform.
Ukraine is also experimenting with combining robotic systems rather than using them separately. Kyiv recently showed a UGV designed to carry FPV drones to a concealed launch point and release them from the vehicle itself, which would allow ambushes from unexpected positions while keeping human operators farther from the front.
None of this means robots are replacing infantry. Ukraine still needs soldiers to clear trenches, hold ground, and exploit battlefield opportunities in ways machines cannot – such as clearing urban buildings. Even so, footage of a UGV shooting and killing Russian soldiers is becoming a common sight.
There are serious limits. One Ukrainian officer said the robots fail to reach their destination four times out of five in some conditions, due to the threat from Russian drones and rough terrain.
Communications are another major vulnerability. Ukrainian forces appear to have improved matters through Starlink integration, but satellite links are not enough on their own. Crews still need radio backups, airborne relays and workarounds for signal loss and electronic warfare. Autonomous navigation systems are being developed for Ukrainian UGVs.
Russia, meanwhile, is adapting too. Russian forces are working on UGVs designed to carry and launch FPV drones, while concepts such as the Roy swarm model and the Cultivator combat platform, suggesting Moscow is exploring how to expand the offensive capabilities of these systems.
During the 2025 winter, the Russians forces recorded a sharp increase in UGV usage across the front. This is becoming a competition in battlefield adaptation, in which the side that learns faster, trains better and scales at an industrial level more effectively will gain an advantage.
This shift will also change how Ukraine builds fortifications. “Trenches will need to be wider, smoother and better protected from above so unmanned ground vehicles can move safely,” said Tonya Levchuk, co-founder and executive director of the Liberty Ukraine Foundation.
First came drones in the sky and at sea. Now robots are increasingly becoming part of the front line itself. Over time, Kyiv is likely to expand this into a wider network of autonomous and robotic systems that can help hold positions and deliver firepower where needed as part of a broader technological shield. That will not solve Ukraine’s personnel problem. But it does continue the country’s larger wartime pattern of using relatively cheap technology to innovate asymmetrically against a bigger Russian army.
About the author
David Kirichenko
David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.
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