China, explained.
Two Chinese nationals, background right, and their alleged Philippine accomplices, left, arrested on espionage charges are escorted out of a room by NBI agents after a press conference in Manila, 25 February 2025 (Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images)
A string of arrests has been a wakeup call for Manila that the threat extends inside the water line.
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Uncovering China’s spying game in the PhilippinesUncovering China’s spying game in the Philippines
Two Chinese nationals were detained in the Philippines last week, accused of espionage-related activities close to sensitive areas. Three Filipino accomplices had assisted, driving the pair in the vicinity of the presidential palace, the US embassy compound, the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Camp Aguinaldo, and Villamor Airbase, home to the Philippine Air Force. They had been using an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catcher – a device that mimics cellular towers to collect information and messages from the air within a one-to-three-kilometre radius.
According to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), “thousands” of critical pieces of data had been gathered by all five men before their arrest.
This is the latest in a string of arrests this year alleging Chinese espionage activities in the Philippines. China has dismissed the idea as “smear campaigns”, yet it is no secret that Beijing maintains an intricate network of spies. China also pursues malign information operations underpinned by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Propaganda Department and the United Front Department. Out of the five Chinese nationals detained by the NBI in January for flying drones to spy on the Philippines' navy, four led CCP-affiliated groups.
While the series of recent detainments illustrate that Manila is waking up to the apparent threats posed by China’s espionage activities, the challenge lies in forging concrete and sustainable countermeasures. The nature of Beijing’s operations means that along with its sophisticated external chain of command, Beijing’s espionage activities involve co-opting local residents, making it more difficult for the target government to push back or create effective and swift countermeasures. Financial incentives explicitly encourage local accomplices, yet the nature of these financial contributions also varies. For example, a recent Reuters report found that various CCP-linked organisations in the Philippines provided lucrative “donations” to law enforcement officers in Metro Manila, including cash and motorbikes.
Where one spy is caught, more are always thought to operate.
Manila is also faced with a legal dilemma concerning local accomplices. The Philippines does not have a foreign interference law that addresses issues related to government officials receiving donations from foreign authorities. More importantly, existing espionage legislation, the Philippines Commonwealth Act No. 616 enacted in 1941, and the espionage provisions in the Revised Penal Code, which took effect in 1932, are outdated and do not address the contemporary nature of espionage activities. As many of these activities are also carried out in the digital space, Manila needs to explore ways to strengthen its cyber-defence capabilities.
There is growing acknowledgment in Manila of the risks amid China’s expansionist interests towards the Philippines’ maritime territory in the South China Sea. Secretary of National Defence Gilberto Teodoro Jr recently emphasised the need to amend the existing espionage law to allow the Philippine government to enforce more strident punishments for acts committed even during peacetime. Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano has also called for lawmakers to amend outdated espionage legislation to give it more teeth to adapt to emerging threats.
The Philippines is not the only victim. Along with key Indo-Pacific partners including Japan and Australia, the struggle to contain China’s espionage is widespread. This makes it vital for like-minded partners to explore collective counter-mechanisms, such as targeted intelligence sharing and cyber-defence capacity building, to more effectively identify, uproot, and impose costs on these spy networks.
Where one spy is caught, more are always thought to operate. So, what is being uncovered today by Philippine law enforcement and investigation agencies could be only the beginning.
About the author
Don McLain Gill
Don McLain Gill is a geopolitical analyst and lecturer at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University in Manila.
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