Energy & resources, explained.
The nuclear icebreaker Yakutia designed to ensure shipping in the Arctic and support the development of the Northern Sea Route (Artem Priakhin via Getty Images)
Russian Arctic energy, not Arctic shipping, is the real beneficiary of the current crisis – and Western sanctions complicate even that.
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Why the Arctic cannot replace the Middle East’s shipping lanesWhy the Arctic cannot replace the Middle East’s shipping lanes
The war involving Iran, Israel and the United States has severely disrupted (Opens in new window)shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, while renewed Houthi attacks have made the Bab el-Mandeb Strait more dangerous. With two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints under pressure, shipping companies are looking for alternatives. One possibility is the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along Russia’s Arctic coastline.
Climate change has made Arctic waters more accessible, raising hopes that the NSR could offer a shorter connection between Europe and East Asia. However, the route’s geographical, economic and political limitations make it an unlikely substitute for Middle Eastern shipping corridors. During the Arctic sailing season, the NSR handles fewer than 0.5% (Opens in new window) as many weekly vessel transits between East Asia and Europe (Opens in new window) as conventional routes. Its greatest potential contribution to the current crisis may instead come from Russian Arctic energy exports.
The NSR offers substantial distance savings (Opens in new window) for some voyages between northern Europe and Northeast Asia. Yet a shorter route does not necessarily translate into lower costs. Ice conditions restrict navigation, particularly during winter, while vessels may require ice-class capabilities or icebreaker assistance. Russia also imposes navigation requirements and charges, adding costs (Opens in new window) and administrative complications.
Environmental and operational risks (Opens in new window) present further obstacles. Arctic waters have limited search-and-rescue infrastructure, while an oil spill in remote, ice-covered waters would be exceptionally difficult to contain. These risks increase the importance of insurance, emergency preparedness and specialised vessels. Western sanctions against Russia introduce financial and legal complications.
Production and shipping constraints limit these projects’ immediate contribution, while redirecting existing exports would do little to increase global supply.
Geography also limits (Opens in new window) the NSR’s usefulness. Although the route can accommodate some large vessels, ice conditions, navigational restrictions and limited infrastructure constrain its capacity to handle the enormous volumes carried through conventional shipping corridors. Furthermore, the NSR primarily benefits trade between Europe and Northeast Asia. It offers little advantage for shipments originating in the Persian Gulf or travelling between Asia and destinations outside northern Europe.
For most shipping companies, diverting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope remains a more practical (Opens in new window) response to disruptions in the Red Sea. However, this diversion cannot circumvent the Strait of Hormuz for cargo originating inside the Persian Gulf. Although this adds distance and fuel costs, the route accommodates the world’s largest commercial vessels and operates year-round without Arctic ice restrictions.
Nevertheless, the Arctic could provide some relief through energy production rather than container shipping. Russian Arctic hydrocarbons could reach Asian consumers without passing through Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb.
Russia’s Vostok Oil project began exports in September 2026 (Opens in new window), while the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project has demonstrated (Opens in new window) its ability to produce LNG despite logistical difficulties. Both projects could eventually contribute additional hydrocarbons to international markets, reducing dependence on supplies passing through Middle Eastern chokepoints. However, production and shipping constraints limit these projects’ immediate contribution, while redirecting existing exports would do little to increase global output.
Expanding these projects would also present Western governments with an uncomfortable choice: whether improving energy security justifies relaxing sanctions that constrain Russia’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine.
China is particularly well positioned (Opens in new window) to benefit from growing Russian Arctic energy exports, having invested in Arctic energy projects and participated in NSR shipping. Japan also has investments (Opens in new window) in Russian LNG developments, while South Korea (Opens in new window) and India (Opens in new window) have explored Arctic maritime opportunities. However, sanctions and political considerations complicate their participation, particularly for US allies Japan and South Korea.
The Middle East crisis is unlikely to turn the Arctic into an alternative Suez Canal. Instead, it may reinforce a different development: the importance of Russian Arctic energy to Asian markets, even as Western sanctions limit the region’s potential.
About the author
Paul Weisko
Paul Weisko is a researcher at the Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv and a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Haifa.
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