North Korea, explained.
This is a partnership that goes beyond the scope of the war (Vladimir Smirnov via AFP/Getty Images)
Will North Korea support a US-Russia deal to end the war in Ukraine?
It’s another party to the conflict, after all.
North Korea, explained.
This is a partnership that goes beyond the scope of the war (Vladimir Smirnov via AFP/Getty Images)
It’s another party to the conflict, after all.
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Will North Korea support a US-Russia deal to end the war in Ukraine?Will North Korea support a US-Russia deal to end the war in Ukraine?
It seems absurd, the idea of North Korea being party to peace negotiations over the future of Ukraine. Yet US President Donald Trump’s phone call with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, which appears to have sidelined Ukraine, could also signal changing prospects for Russia-North Korea security cooperation.
Should the Trump administration be willing to cut a deal with Russia behind Ukraine’s back, it also comes at the apex of Russia-North Korea security cooperation.
North Korea is dispatching a second wave of soldiers to Russia after an initial 11,000 were sent in November 2024. Reports of 4,000 North Korean casualties in the past three months have not hampered Pyongyang’s determination to fight. North Korean troops pulled back from front lines in January, but they are now back after additional training. Combat units are becoming smaller to minimise exposure to Ukrainian drones. North Korean missiles used in the war are also becoming more accurate. North Korea is learning, and it is learning fast.
Russia’s personnel shortage will not soon end immediately – the use of North Korean troops as mercenaries creates a precedent for Russia to seek their deployment elsewhere.
If the United States and Russia can strike a deal to end the war in Ukraine and recognise Russia’s territorial gains, Russia may no longer need additional North Korean troops. This prospect has great implications for the Russia-North Korea alliance. North Korea is reaping financial gains from sending its troops to the front, while Russia’s personnel shortages have allowed Pyongyang to ask for sensitive technological transfers that Moscow would not have otherwise made. Yet should the shooting stop, so will the revival of the North Korean military-industrial complex because Russia is the largest consumer of North Korean ammunitions. Some observers argue that the alliance would cease to exist if the war in Ukraine comes to an end because Russia and North Korea would no longer have anything of substance to exchange.
Yet this is a partnership that goes beyond the scope of the war. The Russia-North Korea Comprehensive Partnership Treaty does not have an expiration date. Russia remains a security guarantor for North Korea, and North Korea welcomes such an arrangement to minimise its dependence on Chinese security guarantees. And Russia’s personnel shortage will not end immediately – the use of North Korean troops as mercenaries creates a precedent for Russia to seek their deployment elsewhere. North Korea is likely to continue sending troops to Russia for training and to replenish Russia’s weapons stockpile. The countries recently arranged to have North Korean troops work at Russian construction sites as well, so these soldiers will stay after the war ends. North Korea’s highly skilled but cheap workers can find jobs in Russian-occupied territory or Kursk on civilian reconstruction projects or in Russian weapons factories.
North Korea has plenty of reasons to support a US-Russia settlement for Ukraine. Russia ending the war in Ukraine via a deal with the United States would help North Korea shift from confrontation to dialogue about its own situation. Russia’s ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora welcomed the prospect of renewed dialogue between North Korean chairman Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump. Pyongyang has not made any substantial policy changes towards the Trump administration because it is assessing if Trump’s reward would be lucrative enough for it to scale back its support for Russia.
If US-Russia ties become cordial, North Korea can benefit from its engagement with both Putin and Trump. North Korea expects that a Trump-Putin deal would not impede Russian employment of North Korean troops and workers or Russian transfer of sensitive technology. If Putin can balance between US and North Korean needs in his negotiation with Trump, Kim could entrust him, rather than a South Korean president, to be the mediator brokering renewed US-North Korea talks. North Korea will avoid having to adjust its treatment of South Korea from a foreign enemy state back to a diplomatic partner like it did in 2018 to enlist South Korea’s shuttle diplomacy to communicate its preferences to and broker summits with the United States.
Russia being a mediator also bodes well for the prospect of any US-North Korea deal because it is immune from South Korean domestic politics. The outcome of a Trump-Putin deal and Putin sharing information of US preferences with North Korea can inform North Korea of the limit of US concessions, lowering the risk of expectation mismatch. At the same time, North Korea can minimise the cost of negotiation failure with Putin’s backing. Unlike in 2019, North Korea will not have to fear tighter sanctions enforcement because Russia can help North Korea evade sanctions with little prospect of US retaliation. South Korea couldn’t offer anything of the sort.
Russia ending the war in Ukraine will lessen its need for North Korean assistance, but the alliance will be necessary for North Korea to increase its leverage if it decides to come back to the negotiation table with the United States. The end of the war in Ukraine will not end the Russia-North Korea alliance.
About the author
Khang Vu
Khang Vu is a visiting scholar in the Political Science Department at Boston College.
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