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ASEAN, explained.
“Hedging” has often become a lazy excuse for lack of initiative, if not outright opportunism (Cuneyt Celik/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Malaysia’s chairmanship sidestepped divisive issues. Manila’s turn will force ASEAN to confront its paralysis.
Head in sand, the way of the ASEAN ostrichHead in sand, the way of the ASEAN ostrich
About the author
Richard Javad Heydarian
Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based columnist, academic, and author.
Topics
Malaysia ended its rotational chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a high note. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim managed to gather top leaders from around the world, most notably US President Donald Trump, who oversaw a new peace agreement between Thailand and Cambodia following the latest border clashes in Indo-China. Malaysia, along with other major export-oriented ASEAN economies, also avoided extremely steep tariff rates initially threatened by Washington.
Anwar also successfully oversaw both the expansion of the regional body to include Timor-Leste as well as the creation of a new partnership with the extremely wealthy and energy-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The ostensible success of Anwar’s regional leadership, however, came at the expense of addressing the fundamental fragility of ASEAN. As I argued earlier this year in The Interpreter, the regional body desperately needs to enhance internal coherence and, accordingly, play a more consequential role on the global stage amid deepening geopolitical uncertainty and great power rivalries.
There is no common ASEAN strategy for dealing with the major powers.
Most notoriously, Anwar not only shunned effectively addressing the festering disputes in the South China Sea, which could quickly spiral into a major regional conflict. Worse, he has subtly criticised neighbouring the Philippines for supposedly raising regional tensions by simply seeking external assistance in the face of China’s aggressive tactics. At times, the Malaysian leader effectively lawyered for China by blaming Western nations’ criticism of Beijing’s brazenly illegal actions in the South China Sea.
Drawing on the Singaporean diplomat Kausikan Bilahari’s infamous analogy, ASEAN has less become a “horse”, namely an effective and nimble regional force, and instead has become an “ostrich” – consciously avoiding difficult and potentially divisive issues. There has been no meaningful attempt at operationalising “ASEAN Centrality” beyond empty slogans and opportunistic hedging. This places the regional body in a potentially perilous situation. The Philippines, as incoming ASEAN chair, will likely push for greater regional involvement on the South China Sea issue. Both the United States and China will also likely press their advantage in the Indo-Pacific region at the expense of ASEAN.
Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos addresses ASEAN leaders in November as the 2026 chair of the grouping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia via ASEAN Secretariat)
“Don’t make us choose” is a de rigueur mantra among ASEAN leaders. Given the traumas of the Cold War in the 20th century, which tore Southeast Asia asunder, regional states are rightly fearful of getting drawn into a new vortex of great power conflict. The de facto strategy of almost all Southeast Asian nations is consequently one of “hedging”, namely “an insistence on not taking sides or being locked into a rigid alignment” and an overall “inclination to diversify and cultivate a fallback position.”
At times, regional states combine “limited deference and selective defiance” when dealing with superpowers, especially when faced with “diffuse, fluid, and myriad” sources of risk that seem manageable. On paper, “hedging” seems like a reasonably sophisticated strategy for ASEAN nations. But it only makes sense under conditions of relative peace, when major powers are broadly cooperative and pose no clear threats to smaller states. In practice, “hedging” has often become a lazy excuse for lack of initiative, if not outright opportunism.
Following its issuance of the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, the regional body has made no concrete efforts towards becoming functionally consequential in shaping the regional order. Proposals for intra-ASEAN military drills have been met with either indifference or derision.
There is no common ASEAN strategy for dealing with the major powers, including on technical issues such as trade and technology. Plans for creating a single ASEAN market have been deadlocked. Worse, the regional body has been catastrophically ineffectual in dealing with major conflicts in its own backyard. Its peace proposal for Myanmar has fallen on deaf ears in Naypyidaw.
Worse, key ASEAN nations refused to publicly support Manila, a founding member, following numerous aggressive maneuvers by Chinese maritime forces against Filipino counterparts. If anything, they have engaged in what can be best described as “strategic gaslighting” against the Philippines. As ASEAN’s incoming chair, however, Manila would likely press for making the South China Sea disputes a core regional agenda – potentially exposing deep divisions and fragilities within the regional body.
After all, this is also a key domestic political issue for the Ferdinand Marcos Jr administration, which is desperate for public approval amid massive corruption scandals this year. A clear majority of Filipinos want the government to take a tougher stance in tandem with Western partners against China’s aggressive actions in disputed waters.
Major powers are expected to step up their military presence in Southeast Asia. A major driver of America’s push for ceasefires in the Middle East and Ukraine is the second Trump administration’s commitment to consolidate its footprint in the Indo-Pacific region. Next year, the United States and other major Western allies are expected to conduct massive drills near disputed areas in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits. Manila’s new and upcoming defence deals with Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Korea and key European powers will further expand external powers’ involvement in major regional maritime disputes.
China will almost certainly respond to growing Western military presence in the region by stepping up its own drills and aggressive tactics, especially against Manila. To ASEAN’s further detriment, Beijing will also likely press on dependent partners to toe the line. In the words of China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun, his country will “pool Eastern strength” to counter US-led network of allies in the region. Growing regional tensions, therefore, risk amplifying divisions within ASEAN or, at the very least, making the regional body an even more peripheral force in shaping the Indo-Pacific security architecture. After a decade of complacency, Southeast Asia is confronting a crossroads.
