Japan, explained.
Strong ties with both Japan and South Korea in areas such as defence cooperation and foreign policy alignment are in Australia’s interest (Getty Images)
Political turmoil in Japan and South Korea cannot be insulated from relations with the region.
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The trouble with Australia’s best friends in AsiaThe trouble with Australia’s best friends in Asia
At a time when Australia is increasingly looking to Japan and South Korea for closer strategic partnerships, the political tumult that has engulfed both countries in recent weeks raises serious questions about their ability to act as reliable and stable counterparts.
The stunningly poor performance of the usually dominant LDP Party in Japan’s elections in October has degraded the authority of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, leaving him with a minority government. Ishiba will now be forced to negotiate a new group of supporters for every single piece of legislation. The risk of political paralysis is real, while the long-term prospects for Ishiba as prime minister appear bleak.
The turmoil in South Korea is far more serious. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s decision to declare martial law in an act akin to a self-coup appears unhinged. Apparently acting with the involvement of the defence minister, army chief, army special forces chief, defence counter-intelligence commander and other members of the “Chungnam faction”, Yoon’s sudden and short-lived ploy last week has backfired spectacularly and raised questions about the strength of democracy in the country. His two-minute press conference apologising for causing “anxiety and discomfort” has done little to assuage concerns or persistent rumours that he might try again.
Fortunately, no one was killed during South Korea’s brief period of martial law – and it was perhaps a less serious political disruption than the ruckus that unfolded in Washington on 6 January 2021. But the Australia-US relationship is close and longstanding, whereas Australia’s government-to-government ties with South Korea, though strong, are still developing. The same goes for Japan.
The perception of both Japan and South Korea as being stable, reliable partners for strategic initiatives, particularly defence and foreign policy cooperation, is vital for the successful continued deepening and expansion of the bilateral relationships.
Together with the United States, the four countries are at the heart of regional efforts to resist China’s attempts to intimidate the broader region.
Japan is mentioned ten times as a vital regional partner in recent Australian strategic documents including the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and 2024 National Defence Strategy. But the implications of a seriously hamstrung and likely short-term Ishiba-led government will most immediately be felt in Australia’s plans to purchase 11 frigates from 2026. In November, Australia selected Germany’s TKMS and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) as the final two contenders for the anticipated AU$10 billion project, known as SEA 3000. MHI is considered by many close observers to be favoured, given the value in adding an additional pillar to Australia-Japan strategic ties. Yet close cooperation at a government-to-government level is essential to success, and while the Japanese government has pre-approved the required transfer of technology necessary should MHI win with its Mogami-class frigate, should Japan’s political difficulties disrupt the Ishiba government’s ability to continue this role, cooperation will be at risk.
For South Korea, the challenge is far greater. Not only was the brief declaration of martial law far more harmful to international perceptions of the country, South Korea lacks the same prominence in Australian strategic doctrine. South Korea is only mentioned twice in the Defence Strategic Review and National Defence Strategy, one of which is in the context of increased US-China competition.
There has been recent progress in formal ties. Korean defence producer Hanwha was selected for a pair of major Australian military contracts for infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers in 2023 and 2020. And in May this year, the Defence and Foreign ministers from Australia and South Korea met in Melbourne to discuss cooperation in defence, critical technology and other strategic areas.
The consequences that unfold from the martial law debacle in Seoul will depend on how quickly the situation is resolved. The decision by Yoon’s party to boycott the impeachment vote on 8 December and the opposition’s pledge to continue pushing for Yoon’s removal sets the stage for ongoing instability.
Ultimately, strong ties with both Japan and South Korea in areas such as defence cooperation and foreign policy alignment are in Australia’s interest. Together with the United States, the four countries are at the heart of regional efforts to resist China’s attempts to intimidate the broader region. But in politics, optics matter, and the domestic political challenges in Japan and South Korea imply fragility at a time when unity of purpose is needed.
About the author
Kieran Thompson
Kieran Thompson is Manager, Defence, Advanced Manufacturing and Technology at Dragoman, a Melbourne-based, international strategic advisory firm.
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