Philippines, explained.
A 2024 stand-off between Philippine Coast Guard personnel and a Chinese Coast Guard vessel during a resupply mission to troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
Publicising China’s actions has rallied Filipino support, but Manila still needs sharper messaging and stronger allies.
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West Philippine Sea: Transparency alone won’t deter ChinaWest Philippine Sea: Transparency alone won’t deter China
On 10 October (Opens in new window), the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) reported that 22 vessels from the Chinese maritime militia had been deployed near Kota Island, a Philippine-held area in Palawan. The task force also confirmed that Chinese Maritime Militia Vessel 9622, along with 22 small boats, returned to the area after two weeks (Opens in new window), where they engaged in unauthorised fishing and dumping waste at sea.
A few days prior, on 8 October (Opens in new window), a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel used water cannons on a Philippine medical mission to evacuate a Filipino soldier from the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal. The BRP Sierra Madre is the Philippine vessel purposely grounded in Ayungin in 1999, in response to China’s militarisation of a nearby reef (Mischief Reef).
The Philippines and China signed a “provisional understanding” in 2024 to provide both sides with a predictable process and reduce the risk of miscalculation. Despite this, the Philippines confirmed on 25 September (Opens in new window) that the CCG and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) obstructed a rotation-and-resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre. Another Philippine vessel, the BRP Datu Magat Salamat, sustained damage on 18 September (Opens in new window) after a CCG ship rammed it while en route to deliver fuel to Filipino fisherfolk.
These incidents support the Philippines’ observation that China’s military and coast guard presence in the West Philippine Sea doubled (Opens in new window) in the last month. The Philippines monitored 101 PLAN and CCG ships around Pag-Asa Island, Ayungin Shoal, Escoda Shoal, and Chinese-controlled Scarborough Shoal. That number is almost double the 56 vessels recorded in August 2026.
Words may be cheap, but words are the building blocks of narratives and discourses on which people’s identities are rooted and flourish.
Repeated intrusions and coercive action at sea are practically a staple in China’s tool chest in the South China Sea. Beyond these, however, widespread malign information campaigns on maritime issues in the West Philippine Sea challenge national security narratives and public trust in democratic institutions. Chinese messaging includes rewriting history, undermining the Philippines’ independence, and projecting a positive image through development projects (Opens in new window). This approach gives China access to economic channels through elite influence and capture.
At the recent Forbes Global CEO Conference in Singapore, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said that the country is “resigned (Opens in new window)” to managing tensions with China and avoiding escalation. The stance is far from that of acquiescence. Indeed, the Philippines’ transparency approach (Opens in new window) replaces the previous policy of quiet diplomacy with public documentation and exposure of coercive maritime actions. Under the initiative, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the NTF-WPS actively publicise videos, photos, and reports of Chinese activities in the West Philippine Sea. By shifting attention to public exposure, the objective is to raise domestic awareness and combat disinformation campaigns. Likewise, the Philippines hopes to garner further international support for upholding the 2016 arbitration award.
While Filipinos generally view the approach positively, it is not a strategy on its own (Opens in new window). The ultimate test is whether this transparency approach has changed China’s behaviour so far. The number of incidents and coercive manoeuvres in the last month alone indicates that the Philippines must level up its game.
Ferdinand Marcos Jr., President of the Philippines (Dean Calma/IAEA)
Beyond transparency, the Philippines can also do the following. The Marcos Jr. administration’s Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC) laid the groundwork (Opens in new window) for substantive changes to Philippine military strategy by emphasising basing dispersion, ranged strike capabilities, and the use of geography. Because it could be seen as a “counter” anti-access/area-denial strategy to China’s posture, especially given the Philippines’ expansion of military positions near Taiwan, Manila needs to deepen its foreign military partnerships and integrate them into the archipelagic concept. Doing so would mean stating clear positions on basing access, weapons deployments, and in-theatre assets. Previous plans largely avoided these conversations to preserve strategic flexibility. However, now is the time to jump-start these discussions, which would require developing not only a theory of victory (Opens in new window) but also an effective strategic communications plan to translate strategic-level deterrence efforts into tactical and operational effect.
Second, the transparency approach is one way of combating foreign information manipulation and interference, but building situational awareness and exposure is only one step in a series of moves. The Philippines must coordinate messaging and actions around shared values, the national interest, and its red lines. It must learn – fast – to hold the semantic high ground (Opens in new window). Words may be cheap, but words are the building blocks of narratives and discourses on which people’s identities are rooted and flourish. Alongside coordinating messaging and actions, the Philippines can work with partners and allies to strengthen digital regulations and tech accountability, given that most Filipinos rely on Facebook for news and information. Indeed, the country is considered the world's social media capital (Opens in new window). Pushing for tech accountability must include private entities and state-backed or proxy media outlets to foster social and institutional resilience. These efforts can drive cooperation at various levels.
Finally, the Philippines should make the most of its 2026 Chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the year is almost over and the agenda and deliverables are already set, the Philippines must show its willingness to turn ASEAN from a mere convening platform into one with normative power. While ASEAN managed to bring in extra-regional powers and preserve the so-called long peace in Southeast Asia, that no longer holds true today. Without a solid response to Myanmar, the Thai-Cambodia border, or the South China Sea, the regional organisation will inevitably lose the centrality it holds dear. The norms on which ASEAN has stood since its inception – consensus and non-interference – reflected the realities of 1967, which are not necessarily the same today. As the 2026 ASEAN Chair, the Philippines should lead the discussions on the region’s normative gains. This can help revamp the organisation and update it to reflect today’s dynamics.
About the author
Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby
Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby is a Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines.
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