Indonesia, explained.
Indonesia’s eagerness to join BRICS+ won’t be matched by economic advantage (Chaideer Mahyuddin/AFP via Getty Images)
An economic ambition will cloud broader impressions of joining what is an inescapably revisionist bloc.
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Joining BRICS+ is not in Indonesia’s interestsJoining BRICS+ is not in Indonesia’s interests
Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS+ solely based on perceived economic opportunities is highly imprudent. Although the initiative offers economic advantages, Indonesia already participates in robust platforms such as the G20 and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). It has formidable economic ties with China, which is one of the BRICS+ members. These platforms effectively bolster its international standing and economic advantages without necessitating alignment with a bloc that opposes Western powers.
Indonesia’s eagerness to join BRICS+ won’t be matched by economic advantage.
One week after President Prabowo Subianto’s inauguration, new Foreign Minister Sugiono sought to justify Indonesia’s decision to join the grouping as consistent with Indonesia’s “free” and “active” foreign policy. According to Sugiono, Indonesia's engagement in BRICS did not reflect alignment but rather an effort to be active in every forum.
However, BRICS clearly represents a “revisionist” bloc that opposes the West. Russia’s role in the grouping is tainted by its actions as an aggressor that disrupts global peace.
Originally founded by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the grouping expanded in 2010 to include South Africa. This year, with four new members in Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, BRICS has growing clout. BRICS+, as it will be known, represents approximately 45 per cent of the world's population and has economic power equivalent to 28 per cent of the global economy, with a strategic position as the largest crude oil power in the world with a percentage of 44 per cent.
Indonesia rightly held reservations about joining the grouping under Joko Widodo’s administration. Indonesia has other options to maximise its international participation. In terms of value, BRICS+ is not in line with Indonesia’s aspirations to be on the “right” path because it does not accord with the country’s longstanding commitment to the 1955 Bandung conference principle of non-alignment.
BRICS+ is considered a rival to Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 2015, for example, BRICS created the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. BRICS+ is supporting de-dollarisation efforts, which aim to reduce the dominance of the US dollar in international trade. BRICS+ has an economic bent and also ventures into the political realm. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, uses BRICS+ as an attempt to break out of Western isolation and as a platform to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
This leaves Indonesia with a dilemma: joining BRICS+ could be taken to implicitly support China's vision of a new world order, while Indonesia still needs support from the West.
China also benefits from the expansion of BRICS membership as a tool to realise its ambitions in geopolitics against the West. This leaves Indonesia with a dilemma: joining BRICS+ could be taken to implicitly support China's vision of a new world order, while Indonesia still needs support from the West. Prabowo must remember that the ten-year US embargo on Indonesia once greatly affected the strength of the Indonesian Air Force. The United States has an important role in facing China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea, which is a strategic area for Indonesia.
Despite controversy over a new statement from Indonesia about North Natuna, the country already has deep layers of economic cooperation with China. China has ranked consistently over the last ten years as Indonesia’s largest trading partner. Since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese investment in Indonesia has flowed rapidly to become the second-largest investor in Indonesia, behind Singapore. Based on the Centre of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) report in 2024 entitled “China-Indonesia Provincial Index”, Chinese investment in Indonesia is very diverse, ranging from academic to economic fields.
If Indonesia wants to benefit economically, its existing partnerships should be the focus. RCEP, for example, covers 30 per cent of global trade and 30 per cent of world gross domestic product, according to reporting from Kompas. Indonesia should also be a pioneer in encouraging ASEAN countries to join the G20, not follow other ASEAN countries in joining BRICS+.
Sugiono stated that one of the reasons Indonesia joined BRICS+ was for the interests of the Global South. The term Global South refers to countries that have been victims of colonialism. However, joining BRICS+ does not immediately legitimise those interests. In fact, joining BRICS+ may inadvertently amplify Russia's position as an aggressor in Ukraine, while the genuine concerns of Global South nations risk being sidelined. And as CELIOS researcher Bhima Yudhistira has also observed, the challenges among BRICS+ countries are immense, such as the territorial dispute between China and India, which makes it a fragile forum for cooperation.
And the financial mechanisms established by BRICS+, namely the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which were designed to mitigate inequalities in developing countries, have yet to demonstrate significant progress. This lack of advancement may simply reflect the underlying interests of the organisation’s founders.
Hence, Indonesia should reconsider its decision to join BRICS+. It must ensure broad interests and consider the implications instead of merely seeking to “appear on the global stage”.
About the authors
Gufron Gozali
Gufron Gozali is a master's student in International Relations at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.
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