A regional response can best manage risks, and the Five Power Defence Arrangement offers just the mechanism.

The intercept of an Australian patrol over the South China Sea escalates a “grey zone” conflict to a dangerous level.

Looking from Vietnam, multi-layer joint efforts to ensure maritime security are welcome in the South China Sea.

Broad understanding about the need to balance and compromise interests will strengthen the system of international law.

Limitations in the established rules and forums have led the region to innovate.

Legal mechanisms, while not definitive, have compelled the claimants to examine their position and communicate them.

Any “minilateral” grouping among Southeast Asian nations must be mindful of its internal contradictions.

A new US report casts doubt on the legality of Chinese maritime claims by also critically examining Australian practice.

Non-alignment has long defined Jakarta’s approach in the world. Neither China’s threats or US pledges will change that.

Jakarta’s ambitions for a maritime alliance with its ASEAN neighbours is the right response to intimidation from China.

A major shipping route, yes, but vital? False claims about the value of these waters only make diplomacy harder.

As a United States ally, Canberra can be a bridge between the region and Washington.

More warships in disputed waters may cause instability. But the presence of navies from afar sends a clear message, too.

A hastily introduced regulation requiring vessels to register may be contrary to the rights of innocent passage.

Five years ago the Philippines largely squandered a crucial legal win. But it’s not too late to marshal support.

The rhetoric weaves between cooperative and competitive, leaving the question of what – and who – to believe.

Beijing’s misapplication of international law in the disputed waters is more complex than it seems on the surface.

Focusing exclusively on China’s use of coercion across the region obscures the true extent of Beijing’s ambitions.

China’s official denials of growing military capability in the region look a lot like gaslighting.

Plus, revisiting assumptions that China would be reluctant to interfere with South China Sea trade routes.

The President of the Philippines may stump up with more nationalist rhetoric, but his true message to Beijing is plain.

A mistake? Maybe. But a US map of Vietnam including the Paracel and Spratly islands raises big questions.

“Joint development” is a misnomer when China has no legal stake in what is Indonesian territory.

By contesting basic principles of international law, China is doing far more damage than is often recognised.

A long-silent claimant has spoken, but will it be heard?

Canberra rejects the PRC’s “historic rights” claim to contested waters but now faces the test of what to do about it.

Despite expectations leaders might collectively rebuke China for its latest actions, the message was more uncertain.

Covid-19 has seen Southeast Asian countries cut defence budgets just as maritime threats look to be growing dire.

While the US is busy containing the coronavirus, Beijing stakes its claims in the South China Sea.

By backing each other’s claims, a united Southeast Asian front would be difficult for Beijing to divide and conquer.

Natuna Islands in the South China Sea has flared again, with Jakarta giving every indication it’s not for backing down.

From the South China Sea to the Rohingya crisis, Saifuddin Abdullah speaks to Lowy’s Ben Bland on Asia’s big challenges.

President Rodrigo Duterte has chosen to woo Beijing, in spite of widespread public objection.

<p>Coercion rather than conciliation is Beijing’s preferred tactic in South China Sea disputes.</p>

While Vietnam would welcome American warships sailing near the disputed islands, other Southeast Asian counties would be concerned about escalating militarisation.

Vietnam has long sought to calibrate its defence posture in the shadows of great power competition.

Communicating contradictory images and aspirations does not help create a consistent perception of ASEAN among its external partners.

China’s neighbours are not passive dominoes or feckless pawns in a US-China power contest.

China is forging ahead with a regional counter-order to displace America.

Three domestic factors are likely to drive the US toward a tougher China policy.

Too much time on problems without solutions will doom ASEAN to paltry progress.

It is sobering that Indian diplomats are talking of the Quad as a way to stiffen Australia’s spine.

Organising a loose strategic coalition might upset Beijing, but that's no reason not to forge ahead.

China's leaders would very reluctantly back down if they were truly convinced that the alternative was war with America. But how would the US convince them of that?

Asia has acquired yet another flashpoint, one that China has deliberately picked at a time and location of its choosing.

The White House seems to regard FONOPs as a means to induce Chinese concessions on the North Korean nuclear issue. This is not what these patrols are designed for.

The US doesn’t have to be willing to blockade Scarborough Reef to stop China from building a military base there.

Boris Johnson’s ebullient pronouncements last week on a future Royal Navy freedom of navigation operation in the Indo-Pacific region have attracted attention, but also criticism.

Beijing is not just trying to take control of an important body of water. It is trying to take control of East Asia and hopes to use the South China Sea dispute to do that.

The Jokowi Administration is not the first Southeast Asian government to use name changes to obscure adverse developments on the water in the South China Sea.